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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if plant equipment packages are a viable
resource for industrial surge and mobilization. A plant equipment package is a
Department of Defense term used to describe an approved complement of different
pieces of controlled industrial plant equipment including special tools, special test
equipment, and other plant equipment. These items are put together at a
predetermined facility to form a production line to manufacture critical war material.
Differences between Army and Navy plant equipment management were identified, and
condition assessments of industrial plant equipment were examined through the study
of Acme-Gridley lathes in Army plant equipment packages.
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This thesis is a study of plant equipment packages
(PEPs) which are designed for use in times of national
emergency (i.e., surge or mobilization). This study will
investigate whether PEPs are a viable resource in times of
industrial surge and mobilization. In order to draw
conclusions on PEPs, assessments of the condition of
inactive government-owned industrial plant equipment (IPE)
in PEPs will be the focus of this study.
In August 1990, President Bush ordered United States
troops into Saudi Arabia in response to the overthrow of
Kuwait by Iraq and the massing of Iraqi troops along the
Saudi Arabian border. Appropriately dubbed "Operation
Desert Shield," American troops took up defensive positions
in Saudi Arabia to prevent a possible invasion by the Iraqi
military. Americans prepared for a "long campaign,"
triggering concern in the press and the nation that United
States forces could get involved in another Vietnam style
conflict. In addition, there was concern over the ability
to sustain military forces in the event of prolonged
conventional conflict.
Today's rapidly changing environment is decreasing the
possibility of nuclear war between the United States and the
Soviet Union (i.e. Glasnost, Perestroika), while increasing
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the threat of low intensity conventional conflicts with
third world nations. Recent events in the Persian Gulf
(Iran/Iraq war, Kuwait invasion, hostage incidents,
terrorism, etc...) highlight the need to maintain a defense
industrial base for the manufacture of critical war
material. Furthermore, sustainability of military forces in
a threatening environment is the quintessential goal of our
industrial base.
Sustainability, in military terms, is the capability to
maintain the necessary level and duration of combat activity
to achieve national objectives [Ref. 1]. Industrial
base surge and mobilization capability directly affect
military sustainability. Without a responsive industrial
base to meet increased demand during wartime, sustainable
operations are unrealistic. This concept was illustrated
early in World War II (1943) when...
...the availability of shipping was dictating the date
of desired operations. The availability of landing
craft and landing craft engines was controlling the
timing of amphibious operations. The availability of
steel plate was controlling new increases in shipping
and landing craft .... Without accurate and timely
knowledge of what the homefront would make available to
the military on a certain date, military planning was
lacking in reality. Logistical considerations were
controlling the extent of operations and timing.
[Ref. 2]
If war broke out in the Persian Gulf between the United
States and Iraq, our forces must be prepared to sustain a
long term military conflict or escalate to nuclear weapons.
The use of nuclear weapons on a third world country (not
2
directly t:ceatening our nation) does not appear to be a
viable option to the United States for many, mostly
political reasons (i.e. distance from Soviet Union,
political outcry in the U.S., world reaction).
Sustainability in a long war therefore would entail
activating some of our plant equipment packages (PEPs).
PEPs manufacture critical war material (i.e., munitions) in
the event of surge/mobilization.
The importance of munitions in modern warfare has been
noted by strategists and logisticians alike. For instance,
while serving as the Director of Supply Operations and
Readiness, on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief United
States Atlantic Fleet, Rear Admiral Miller wrote:
First, while we have many material shortfalls, none are
as important as munitions. Munitions, especially threat
oriented, are the most critical and time sensitive
commodities in the heat of battle. It is still the
single most critical war stopper. The lead time for
"smart weapons" compared to World War II vintage is so
long that production surge will not immediately affect
the outcome of an intense global conflict. It will be a
"come as you are" war. [Ref. 3]
Since many of our Allies depend upon the United States to
supply some war material to sustain their operations,
activation of PEPs might be necessary whether United States
forces engage Iraqi troops or not.
Many military experts considered that victory in World
War II was the result of massed material rather than
military skill [Ref. 4]. It was our industrial base
which provided the material necessary for victory. In one
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sense, PEPs act as deterrents to forces contemplating war
with the United States due to their capacity to produce
critical war material before the depletion of war reserve
stocks.
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The following
is a synopsis of each chapter:
Chapter II provides a definition and illustration of a
PEP. It explains the purpose and provides a brief history
on PEP evolution. Chapter II concludes with a thought on
the future challenge of PEPs in light of their expense and
the National debt facing the government.
Chapter III explores PEP management in the Army and
Navy. It illustrates the key levels of PEP management and
policy for each service, beginning with the Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics,
and ending at the planned producer of the PEP. The most
important management instructions are reviewed and some
problems facing PEP management are explored.
Chapter IV defines condition assessments and discusses
evidence that indicates that these assessments do not
accurately reflect the actual operating condition of
inactive government-owned industrial plant equipment (IPE)
in a PEP. The investigation suggests that most condition
assessments may be overstated. If correct, this brings into
doubt the effectiveness of our surge/mobilization plans, and
PEP usefulness in general.
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Chapter V reviews procedures for condition assessments
of inactive government-owned IPE. It shows that condition
assessments of inactive government-owned IPE are done by
visual inspections and suggests an alternative way to
perform assessments that would be more accurate. A cost
analysis was done on the visual condition assessment method
and the more reliable alternative method.
Chapter VI contains conclusions and recommendations. It
draws upon chapters II through V and makes suggestions to
improve PEP readiness or to eliminate PEPs that are not





Much has been written about the deterioration of the
United States' defense industrial base, including
government-owned and privately-owned production facilities.
Two examples of the literature on this topic include a 1980
House of Representatives report entitled "The Ailing Defense
Industrial Base: Unready for Crisis," [Ref. 5], and
a 1988 book entitled Mobilizing U. S. Industry: A Vanishing
Option for National Security?" [Ref. 6]. The first
highlighted the deterioration of our defense industrial base
and its effect on our defense capabilities, while the second
addressed the need to maintain an adequate defense
industrial mobilization base and the problems involved with
maintaining it.
Little, however, has been written about the plant
equipment packages (PEPs) which are an important part of the
defense industrial base. This chapter will examine the
history of PEPs: what they are, why they are important, and
where they originated.
B. PLANT ZQUIPMENT PACKAG=
PEP is a Department of Defense (DOD) term used to
describe an approved complement of different pieces of
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controlled industrial plant equipment, including special
tools, special test equipment, and other plant equipment.
This equipment can be put together at a predetermined
facility to form one or more production lines to manufacture
critical war material [Ref. 7]. The production line may or
may not be augmented with contractor-owned equipment. One
or more types of war material can be manufactured under one
PEP. For example, PEP #0224 which is located at the
government-owned contractor-operated (GOCO) Riverbank Army
Ammunition Plant in California, contains eight production
lines capable of manufacturing 11 different items. (See
Appendix A for the listing of current PEPs and their related
end items.) The total acquisition cost and number of
special tools (ST), special test equipment (STE), industrial
plant equipment (IPE), and other plant equipment (OPE),
which make up PEP #0224 are identified in Table 2.1.
TABLE 2.1
ACQUISITION COST OF PEP #0224






Production line #8 in PEP #0224 at Riverbank Army
Ammunition Plant has 34 pieces of IPE and is capable of
manufacturing the M42, M46, and M77 metal grenade bodies.
These grenades are basically manufactured the same way
except for modifications on the M77 (an improvement over the
original M42) which allows better fragmentation and use in
extremely cold weather.
Many operations are required in the manufacturing
process to turn a piece of raw metal into a grenade body
capable of being fitted into a rocket or artillery round.
The process starts by heating a metal ingot to a high
temperature in a blast furnace. The ingot is then forged by
a cupping and drawing process on a 500 ton press which
punches the ingot into the basic shape of the grenade body.
The body then goes through 44 additional processing steps
which include pickling, coin shouldering, grinding,
additional pressing, piercing, washing, and testing for
conformity to military specifications. Finally, the grenade
body is packed and shipped to another facility to be filled
with explosive, armed and fitted into a rocket or artillery
round. (Figure 2.1 illustrates the various steps in this
production line that are needed to manufacture a finished
grenade body from a piece of steel.) It takes about three
weeks (assuming work shifts of 40 hours per week) from the
time a piece of steel begins the manufacturing process until
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it is transformed into a grenade body ready for shipment to
the loading facility.
PEE's were designed to provide a specific level of output
to meet surge or mobilization requirements. Until surge or
mobilization occurs, PEPs usually remain inactive (i.e., not
in use). In some cases however, (such as Navy managed PEPs)
one or more production lines in a PEP may be actively
* running at a level below the surge/mobilization production
rate. A clearer explanation of this will be discussed in
Chapter III.
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IPE which makes up a specific PEP may or may not be
stored together and may be inactive or active at one or more
locations in the United States [Ref. 7]. Depending upon the
priority of the end item manufactured, production lines can
be assembled and operating between two and 12 months after
the start of the surge/mobilization process.
C. IIDUSTRIAL BASE
Our industrial base consists of a number of government
and privately-owned industrial production facilities in the
United States and Canada, including depot-level equipment
and maintenance facilities that would be available in a
crisis [Ref. 8]. Production facilities can be
either contractor owned/contractor operated (COCO),
government owned/contractor operated (GOCO), government
owned/government operated (GOGO), or state owned. Our
industrial base gives the nation the capability to sustain
the surge or mobilization production rates needed to support
military actions. PEPs are part of our industrial base
which produce critical war material during
surge/mobilization.
As seen in Table 2.2, over 97% of our surge/mobilization
facilities are COCO facilities or private industry IRef 8].
Although PEPs account for only about 1% of our total defense
industrial capability, they produce material, such as
ammunition, which is vital in wartime. Furthermore, PEP
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manufacturing capability either cannot be found anywhere
else in the United States or exists in plants with a
production output too small to be adequate in any major
conflict.
TABLE 2.2











Surge is a term used to describe accelerated industrial
base production of selected material to meet demand during
emergencies. The emergency may be a limited war, disaster,
economic crisis, demonstration of national will, replacement
of war losses, reaction to warnings from aggressive nations,
enemy technological breakthrough, enemy production surge, or
defense preparations [Ref. 9]. Depending on the
emergency, surge may affect one or more industries.
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In the Vietnam conflict and the United States troop
movement into Saudi Arabia (August 1990), operations were
supported with industrial base surge. During "Operation
Desert Shield" for instance, the Army had to substantially
increase the production of several items in the early weeks
of deployment. These items are listed in Table 2.3.
TABLE 2.3
SURGE ITEMS REQUIRED BY THE
ARMY IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
Ultra-light Camouflage Net System
Chemical Boots
M17A2 Protective Mask
3000 Gal. Flexible Tank
5000 Gal. Tanker Truck
Flameless Ration Heater
Patriot (PAC 2) Missile
Advanced Tactile
Missile System (ATACMS)




400 Gal. Water Tank
Type II Remains Bag
Laundry Water Recycler
AN/TSC 93 Tac Satellite
Communication System
Private industry participation in surge production is on
a voluntary basis. As long as money is available and
increased production capacity is feasible to satisfy the
increased demand as well as regular customer business,
private industry will accept orders under surge conditions.
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Private industry can increase production surge by adding
extra shifts, using overtime, subcontracting work, or using
material previously laid away. For example, material
previously obtained for future production can be used
immediately to increase surge output. New orders are then
placed to restock material taken from inventory. Assuming
these latter orders arrive in a timely manner, the end
result is that both surge and future job requirements are
satisfied.
Material available from private industry that is
required during surge operations can be obtained by using
conventional contracts, letter contracts, basic ordering
agreements, or exercising a surge option clause in an
existing contract. The surge option clause is preferred by
DOD personnel responsible for contract administration
because it saves procurement and administrative lead time.
If such a clause is exercised, production can begin before a
price is negotiated. The government benefits from quick
industry response while companies benefit from increased
business.
Many Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFAR) can be waived under
emergency conditions. For example, the requirement to
advertise for procurement of supplies or services in the
Commerce Business Daily 30 days prior to the award of the
contract can be waived if there is an "unusual and
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compelling urgency," or if disclosure of needs could
compromise national security [Ref. 8:p. F-2]. Appendix F in
the DOD "A Guide for Industrial Mobilization," March 1989,
identifies several additional FAR/DFAR surge/mobilization
relief measures.
3. MOBILIZATION
Unlike surge, mobilization is a term used to describe
the complete transformation of a country's resources (public
and private) to the support of national objectives in
wartime or other emergency. These resources include labor,
material, production facilities, transportation, fuel and
capital.
Wars are fought and won-or lost-on the land, on the
water, in the air, and on those battle lines behind the
front where the civilian forces stand. It is not enough
to mobilize the Nation's military strength. There must
be a mobilization of her full economic resources-
industrial, agricultural and financial. These must be
organized, coordinated, and directed with thA same
strategy that governs the operations of the purely
military arms of the service. [Ref. 10]
Mobilization can be divided into four levels:
selective, partial, full, and total. Each level is
determined by the degree of threat. The higher the level,
the greater the commitment of the country's resources. When
total mobilization (the highest level) is reached, the
nation's resources are employed to their maximum limits.
Mobilization is initiated by the President's declaration
of a national emergency. Unlike surge, mobilization is not
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voluntary. It is a legal and government directed conversion
of a country's resources toward war production. The
National Defense Act of 1916 gave the President broad powers
to do this. In time of war, or when war is imminent, the
President has the authority to place priority orders with
any firm, take possession of any plant whose owner refuses
to accept or give preference to a priority order, and to
operate seized plants [Ref. 11]. The United States
has mobilized twice during its history, first during World
War I and then again in World War II.
F. WORLD WAR I MOBILIZATION
Mobilization was unique in World War I because there
were no previous examples to follow. Problems were solved
on a trial and error basis. One of the most difficult
problems the government faced was how to organize and
convert its industrial base from peacetime production to war
production. A lack of priorities for goods and services,
raw materials, and transportation caused confusion and
delays early in the war:
Unimportant goods were being made before essentials,
commodities were being produced that could not find
transportation facilities to take them to their
destinations, while other articles were carried to
embarkation points by the railroads only to find no
ships available to take them to France.
(Ref. 12]
The establishment of the War Industries Board in 1917
created a structure to ensure change in our industrial base
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priorities to meet the military requirements of our
Government and Allies. Through the use of priorities
(including price fixing and conservation), the industrial
base was diverted from individual needs to national needs.
Just as war production began to peak however, the fighting
stopped. [Ref. 10:p. 6] Our industrial base then converted
back to a peacetime economy and the United States slipped
back into isolationism.
As a result of these experiences with mobilization of
the industrial base in World War I, Congress passed the
National Defense Act of 1920. This act centralized
procurement and planning responsibilities for mobilization
under the Assistant Secretary of War. As a result of this
act, Industrial Mobilization Plans (M-DAY Plans) were
developed in 1931 and revised in 1933, 1936 and 1939.
Although it was often referred to as the Industrial
Mobilization Plan, it was actually three separate plans: the
Protective Mobilization plan (which addressed mobilization
of the nation's manpower), the Procurement plan (which
pertained to the procurement of equipment for the military),
and the Industrial Mobilization plan (which concerned the
administrative mechanisms for directing industrial
mobilization, and operational procedures to carry it out)
[Ref. 13].
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G. WORLD WAR II MOBILIZATION
Although the United States had been slowly increasing
its war production capacity to support its Allies, it was
not until after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor that the United
States had the full support of the nation to move toward
total mobilization. The War Production Board, established
in January 1942, was responsible for mobilization of our
industrial resources by assuring "the most effective
prosecution of war procurement and production" [Ref. 13:p.
207]. A year later, in May 1943, the Office of War
Mobilization was established. With strong presidential
backing, the Office of War Mobilization was given some of
the functions of the War Production Board that had not been
managed properly, in addition to authority over manpower not
in the Armed Forces [Ref. 13 :p. 554]. Creation of the
Office of War Production was a reaction to the need for more
centralized authority from the president, something
noticeably absent in the War Production Board.
Munitions production in World War II peaked around 1944.
To put this production rate in perspective, we "...built one
plane every five minutes; produced 150 tons of steel every
sixty seconds; turned out 8 aircraft carriers a month, and
launched 50 merchant ships a day;..." [Ref. 4:p. 540].
Figure 2.2 (from "Industrial Mobilization For War," Volume
I, 1947) illustrates munitions production from July 1940 to
August 1945 in billions of standard 1945 dollars.
17
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Figure 2.2: U. S. Munitions Production
The job of reconversion to a peacetime economy fell to
the War Production Board. They had five tasks that were
spelled out in a August 1945 letter from the President of
the United States: 1) expand production of materials in
short supply, 2) limit manufacture of products that use
scarce materials, 3) control inventories, 4) break
bottlenecks, and 5) allocate scarce materials for production
of low priced essential items (Ref. 12:p. 945]. Within
weeks, the War Production Board canceled thousands of
government contracts, revoked hundreds of controls on
consumer goods and relaxed construction limitations.
Reconversion to a civilian economy was both rapid and
successful.
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R. EVOLUTION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT PACKAGES
Our country was fortunate in the first and second world
wars to have the time to build up our industrial base.
Today, technology has increased the speed of warfare to an
extent never seen in the first or second world wars. During
the next war, there may not be time to build up our
industrial base in the same ways we have done in the past.
In a research paper entitled "Comparative Industrial
Capabilities of Major Combatants during World War II" (April
1982) the authors concluded that, like World War II,
mobilization to a wartime economy today may still require
two to four years due to the advancing technology of our
weapon systems. Furthermore, it has been estimated that
even in emergency conditions (mobilization), it takes about
18 months (at the earliest) to construct new plants for
production. [Ref. 14] With today's military
technology, a war could be over in 18 months.
War material that is not readi'y available from private
industry or that is beyond their capability to produce at
the necessary rates could create a serious problem for a
military force engaged in war if initial stocks were limited
and the conflict lasted long enough. The military needs a
rapid and continuous supply of critical war materials (i.e.
munitions) to sustain combat operations. This is the main
reason for the creation of plant equipment packages.
19
I. MACHINE TOOLS
Most businesses converted their production plants back
to more profitable enterprises after World War I and II.
There simply was not enough profit in manufacturing
munitions at the end of the war. Along with this
conversion, machine tools, which consisted of the different
types of metalworking industrial plant equipment shown in
Table 2.4, were sold, leased, returned to the government, or
used on new production lines. Due to reconversion efforts,
priorities for machine tools went to the civilian economy
first. Afterward, the military services could acquire the
remaining equipment to meet their immediate peacetime needs.
TABLE 2.4
INDUSTRIAL PLANT EQUIPMENT-METAL WORKING MACHINES
LATHES MACHINING CENTER & WAY TYPE
BORING MACHINES DRILLING & TAPPING MACHINES
BROACHING MACHINES GEAR CUTTING & FINISHING MACHINES
GRINDING MACHINES SAWS & FILING MACHINES
MISC MACHINE TOOLS ELECTRICAL & ULTRASONIC EROSION MACHINES
MILLING MACHINES BENDING & FORMING MACHINES
PLANERS & SHAPERS MISC SECONDARY METAL FORMING & CUTTING
MACHINES
In World War II and the Korean War, a shortage of
machine tools affected the Nation's ability to meet material
requirements [Ref. 15]. Machine tools were in
demand during wartime because they were used in the
manufacture of most of the hard implements of war (i.e.
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tanks, planes, ships, vehicles, guns, ammunition, etc...).
In addition, they were also used to manufacture items
essential for the civilian population.
Immediately following World War II, the War department
pressured Congress to maintain a reserve of industrial plant
(and other) equipment for future contingencies. As a
result, Congress passed Public Law 364 in August 1947. It
authorized the War Department or Secretary of the Navy, to
assure the "continued availability" of the "industrial
capacity of shipyards, plants, and equipment" by use of
"terms, conditions, restrictions and reservations in
disposition" (i.e., to withhold from disposal or sale) if it
is in the interest of national defense. [Ref. 16]
This was the first successful effort to retain industrial
plant equipment (machine tools) for future contingencies.
Passage of the National Industrial Reserve Act in 1948
went one step further. It called for:
... a comprehensive and continuous program for the future
safety and for the defense of the United States by
providing adequate measures whereby an essential nucleus
of Government-owned industrial plants and a national
reserve of machine tools and industrial manufacturing
equipment may be assured for immediate use to supply the
needs of the armed forces in time of national emergency
or in anticipation thereof; [Ref. 17]
This act gave the Secretary of Defense (the overall National
Industrial Reserve coordinator) authority to establish
general policies for the care, maintenance, use, security of
and recording of data for property in the National
21
Industrial Reserve. This was just one step away from the
concept of DOD PEPs.
J. PACKAGZ PLMNT TOOLS
Although the National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948 was
designed to prevent a shortage of machine tools in the
future, it was unfortunately too late to prevent shortages
from occurring during the Korean War. A lack of machine
tools caused delays in meeting production quotas for
ammunition, tanks, and other military supplies. In a letter
to the Chief of Ordnance, the Commanding General of the
Ordnance Tank Center wrote:
...contractors were having difficulty in securing the
machine tools needed to support their production
schedule...Chrysler, Fisher Body and Ford plants would
be delayed six to seven months in starting production on
the T-48 Tank and would be delayed eight to nine months
in reaching the scheduled production...
[Ref. 18]
There were three ways the government tried to resolve these
shortage problems. To meet immediate needs, machine tools
were purchased in large quantities in the United States and
abroad. Second, machine tools were recalled from loans to
activities not providing essential war production (i.e.
schools). Third, the M-Day Pool Order Program (referred to
now as the Machine Tool Trigger Order Program) was set up
using standby agreements with machine tool manufacturers to
provide equipment during mobilization. (Vawter, Roderick, 1983,
p. 29)
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Sometime during the Korean conflict, a program for
retention and storage of industrial equipment essential to
the manufacture of critical war material was developed by
the United States Army [Ref. 18:pp. 21-24]. Unlike the
National Industrial Reserve program established in 1948
however, this equipment would be retained under Army
management. In the event of an emergency like the Korean
War, the Army would not be caught short in the production of
critical material. Sometime between December 1951 when the
Army developed their plan for equipment retention and
September 1952, they began using the term "Package Plant
Tools." In Army Special Regulation 715-5-20 of 12 September
1952, concerning inventory of production equipment, it
states that:
Package plant tools...is that equipment maintained
intact in reserve condition and when activated is
capable of producing a complete military end item or
major component at a specific rate of production.
Future activation is planned as a unit. This equipment
may be in plants under the custody of one of the
military departments or in National Reserve
Plants... [Ref. 18:p. 74]
Package plant tools were required to have mobilization
and Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASOD) numbers assigned
to each piece of equipment. An ASOD number was a code which
identified the unique package the equipment belonged to, and
the planned producer of the end item (i.e. what production
facility). Equipment assigned to the same planned producer
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had the same ASOD number. The ASOD number evolved into the
PEP number currently used today. [Ref. 19]
A mobilization number was a code signifying the maximum
production rate per month (at mobilization) of the end item
or items produced by the production line the equipment was
on. If more than one production facility made the same end
item, the mobilization numbers could be different for each
facility.
In July 1953, the individual Services were granted
layaway authority with the passage of Public Law 130, 83rd
Congress. It gave the services broad authority to...
provide for the acquisition, construction,
establishment, expansion, rehabilitation, conversion,
and installation, on land or at plants privately or
publicly owned, of such industrial type plants,
buildings, facilities, equipment, machine tools,
utilities, and...as may be necessary for defense
production or mobilization reserve purposes, and to
provide for the maintenance, storage and operation
thereof... [Ref. 20]
However, overall approval authority for retention and
recertification of industrial plant equipment still rested
with the Assistant Secretary of Defense. It was not until
July 1978 that this authority was officially delegated to
the individual military services.
K. PLANT EQUZPMENT PACKAGES
On November 16, 1973, Public Law 93-155 (amendment to
the National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948) was passed.
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This was the first time the term plant equipment package was
defined in a law. It stated that:
.machine tools and other industrial manufacturing
equipment may be held in plant equipment packages or in
a general reserve to maintain a high state of readiness
for production of critical items of defense material, to
provide production capacity not available in private
industry for defense material, or to assist private
industry in time of national disaster.
[Ref. 21]
A significant change in the PEP approval process
occurred in 1978. In Department of Defense Directive (DODD)
4275.5 of 13 July 1978, authority for approving and
recertifying plant equipment packages was delegated to the
Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments and the
Director of the Defense Logistic Agency (DLA). In addition,
the Services were to establish management guidelines for
proper disposal of industrial plant equipment deleted from a
PEP and to maintain PEPs under their management in a high
state of readiness.
L. CONCLUSION
PEPs evolved from the United States military's need to
have a rapid and continuous supply of critical war materials
(i.e. munitions) to sustain combat operations. To ensure
availability of this critical material, complete packages of
industrial plant equipment, other plant equipment, special
tools, and special test equipment were laid away under
individual military service management. PEPs were designed
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to retain a critical manufacturing capability to complement
private industry or provide for a capability that did not
exist in private industry.
Today, there is still a need to maintain the capability
to produce munitions and sustain forces in the event of
conventional war. However, the high cost of replacement and
maintenance of industrial plant equipment, the
increasing National debt and questions on PEP viability to
meet surge/mobilization requirements have resulted in
challenges to the whole concept of PEPs. These challenges
will determine whether the United States retains or loses




The changing political climate around the world
(glasnost, German unification) and the increasing United
States national debt (almost four trillion dollars) are
forcing the United States to reevaluate the costs of its
military infrastructure. The current administration's goal
is to reduce military spending without compromising military
readiness. To this end, military programs and policies are
facing increased pressure from Congress to justify missions
and expenditures. One area receiving increased attention
involves the management of plant equipment packages (PEPs).
This chapter will examine PEPs in DOD.
B. P1P TRENDS
The Army established its first PEPs in 1956, the Navy in
1966, and the Air Force in 1971 [Ref. 22]. Even
though the Navy and Air Force established their PEPS about
10 to 15 years later than the Army, PEPs have been
decreasing in numbers (disestablished) among all the
Services since the late 1970's. Figure 3.1 shows the PEP
trend for the Services over the last several years. As of
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15 October 1990, there are only 100 PEPs left in DOD. They
are distributed between the following Services:
* The Army owns 92 PEPs (92%)
" The Navy owns eight PEPs (8%)
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PEPs have been disestablished for some of the following
reasons: a commercial source was identified that could
manufacture the same item as the PEP in the required time
frame, advances in weapons technology, or changes in United
States defense policy.
I See Appendix B for the actual number of PEPs by Service
and year. Defense Logistic Agency (DLA) PEPs were not included
in this graph due to the absence of data at DA.
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The M-1 tank is an example where a technologically
superior weapon system replaced an older system (M-60 tank)
resulting in the disestablishment of a PEP. As a
consequence of the introduction of the M-1 tanks, the
mobilization requirement for the M-60 Tanks became obsolete.
In 1987, PEP #0438, which manufactured the M-60 tank at the
Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant, was disestablished
[Ref. 24]. To this date, there has not been a PEP
established for the M-1 tank.
In addition to technology, changes in defense policy
affect the number of PEPs. A recent example is the Godwin
Memorandum. In November 1986, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Logistics promulgated the Godwin
Memorandum. As related to PEPs, this document stated that:
The continued storage and maintenance of inactive
plants, industrial plant equipment (IPE) and other plant
equipment (OPE) shall be reviewed in detail and all but
the most essential property removed from the DOD
inventory. All such inactive property should be
included in this review and be considered a candidate
for disposal unless retention is fully justified.
Examples of property to be included in this review
include: All inactive property (IPE, OPE, ST, and STE)
in plant equipment packages (PEPs). This includes
contractor owned property that DOD is funding to retain
in storage. Plans must be established for reducing PEPs
to the very minimum by November 1988. Retained PEPs
must be upgraded to an immediate use condition within
current budget constraints...
Inactive GOCO plants...having a marginal surge or
mobilization potential should be turned over to the
private sector. [Ref. 25]
In effect, the Godwin memorandum ordered the military to
clean house. A moratorium on PEPs was imposed until certain
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specifications were met (i.e. upgrade those PEPs that are
retained), and a plan for disposition of non-essential
facilities was to be drawn up by the Military Services for
presentation to the Assistant Secretary for Defense
Acquisition and Logistics.
C. aOVt WVzw
PEP management policy and guidance comes from four
organizational levels in the Navy and five levels in the
Army. Figure 3.2 shows the general PP organizational
management chain from the DOD level to the planned producer.
I ASA R, D&A AsN
AMO
I AVSOoM AMOCOM [ NAVSEA I ENAVAIR
2PEPs _9 0 PEPs j_3PEPs 5PEPs
Figure 3.2: PEP Management Chain
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Overall PEP management policy and guidance for the
Military Services originates in DOD at the Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition and is delegated to the Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics
(OASD P&L). The OASD P&L, is responsible for publishing DOD
Directive (DODD) 4275.5, containing broad management policy
for the acquisition and management of industrial resources.
Below the OASD P&L, PEP management guidance is refined at
the Service level.
PEP management and policy guidance for the Army is
formulated by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for
Research, Development and Acquisition (ASA RD&A) while this
function is performed in the Navy by the Assistant Secretary
of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN
RD&A). The Air Force disestablished their PEPs in 1984.
Each Service publishes and implements their own instructions
on PEP management in accordance with DODD 4275.5. These
instructions are:
" Army Industrial Preparedness Program (AR 700-90) Chapter
5, titled "Management of the PEPs and Industrial Reserve
Facilities"
" Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4862.8A,
titled "Acquisition and Management of Industrial
Resources"
The third level in the PEP management chain is at the
Systems Command (SYSCOM) level for the Navy and the Army
Material Command (AMC) level for the Army. There are two
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SYSCOMs at the Navy level which publish standard operating
procedures on PEP management: the Naval Sea Systems Command
(NAVSEA), and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). At the
AMC, most PEP management responsibility is delegated to the
Industrial Engineering Activity (IEA), a staff organization
attached to the AMC [Ref. 26]. IEA publishes the
Army's basic PEP instruction, AR 700-90.
The individual planned producer is the final link in the
chain for the Navy. These are producers and repair
facilities that have voluntarily committed themselves to
manufacture critical items during surge/mobilization [Ref.
8:p. D-9]. In the Army however, PEP management policy and
guidance is further refined by another level of management
at two of the Army's major subordinate commands: the Army
Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM), and the
Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM).
The responsibility at the planned producer level is the
same, regardless of what Service owns the facility or
whether the facility is GOGO, GOCO, or COCO. The planned
end item must be made in the right quantity and available in
the required time frame to meet surge/mobilization
requirements. Depending on the type of facility ,i.e. GOGO,
GOCO, COCO) and contract specifications however, meeting the
requirements for materials, manpower, or equipment needed to
produce the end item for surge/mobilization could be a
government or commercial responsibility.
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D. M INSTRUCTIONS
The are a handful of instructions and publications
related to PEP management. Some of these are:
* DOD Directive (DODD) 4215.18, ManaQement of Defense-
Owned Industrial Plant Eauipment (IPE).
* DODD 4005.1, Industrial Preparedness Program.
e DODD 4275.5, Acauisition and Management of Industrial
Resources.
9 DOD Instruction 4155.4, Inspection and Reportina of
Departmental Industrial Reserve Plants/Maintenance
Facilities.
* DOD Instruction 4005.3, Industrial Preparedness
Planning.
* DOD Manual 4005.3, Industrial Preparedness Planning
Manual.
* DLA Manual (DLAM) 4215.1, Management of Defense-Owned
Industrial Plant Eauipment (IPE).
* DLA Regulation 4215.4, Acquisition and Management of
Industrial Resources.
Three of the most important ones used by the Military
Services to manage their PEPs are: DODD 4275.5, DODD
4215.18, and DLAM 4215.1.
DODD 4275.5 is a broad directive with three purposes:
" Establish uniform policy for the acquisition and
management of facilities, special tooling, and special
test equipment, whether acquired by and used solely
within DOD or operated and used by a contractor.
" Assign responsibilities for reviewing the use,
maintenance, expansion, modernization, replacement, and
disposal of industrial resources, with their related
programming, budgeting, and financing procedures.
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* Authorize publication of DLAM 4215.1, "Management of
Defense-Owned Industrial Plant Equipment."
According to DODD 4275.5, the Undersecretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering has overall authority to develop
and issue policy, procedures, and guidance on PEP
management. Today, due to realignment of the DOD, this
overall authority is the responsibility of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition.
The provisions of DODD 4275.5 cover the retention,
maintenance, and modernization of DOD-owned plant equipment
and PEPs. In accordance with DODD 4275.5, machine tools and
other industrial manufacturing equipment may be held in PEPs
or in a general reserve to:
" Maintain a high state of readiness for production of
critical items of defense material.
" Provide production capacity for defense material not
available in private industry.
" Assist private industry in time of national disaster.
Furthermore, each military service must establish management
guidelines to ensure that government-owned equipment is
immediately released from a PEP when it is no longer needed,
and that required PEPs are maintained in a state of
readiness. [Ref. 27]
In addition to DODD 4275.5, the Military Departments are
responsible for implementing DODD 4215.18 which establishes
policy and assigns responsibilities for managing DOD-owned
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IPE (the most important ingredient in a PEP). The key
feature of this directive is the assignment of DLA as the
DOD central organization responsible for the following IPE
management practices:
" Developing and maintaining records covering description,
location, and utilization status of all DOD IPE located
on DOD installations and contractor plants worldwide.
* Acting as a clearinghouse for all DOD Component
requirements for IPE to assure optimum reutilization or
disposal.
" Providing technical direction over central IPE storage
sites to include preservation, testing and repair,
overhaul or rebuild of equipment.
" Developing uniform equipment coding, recording, and
reporting of IPE.
" Developing and maintaining a General Reserve of IPE at a
level sufficient to provide a DOD industrial
preparedness capability adequate to meet mobilization
production plans of the Armed Forces.
[Ref. 28]
In accordance with DODD 4215.18, DOD Components are
responsible for a number of functions. The most important
of these functions are:
* Managing and controlling all active IPE and PEPs in
their custody.
* Assisting the Director DLA, in developing, publishing,
implementing and improving systems and procedures for
identification, recording, reporting, storage,
maintenance, redistribution, and disposal of IPE,
including IPE in the possession of contractors.
* Developing, publishing, and maintaining such other
implementing instructions as are necessary in support of
the policy in DODD 4215.18.
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" Providing forecasts for unusual requirements to augment
or amend retention level objectives for the General
Reserve.
" Screening with the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment
Center (DIPEC) prior to repair, overhaul, or procurement
of IPE.
[Ref. 29]
The third document providing PEP management guidance to
the Military Services is DLAM 4215.1, Management of Defence-
Owned Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE). Authorized by DODD
4275.5 and DODD 4215.18, the purpose of DLAM 4215.1 is to
establish procedures for the control and redistribution of
idle IPE within DOD and for providing other management
services to the Military Departments and DOD Components
[Ref. 30]. DLAM 4215.1 is identified by a unique
code for each Service: Army - AR 700-43, Navy - NAVSUP PUB
5009, Air Force - AFM 78-9. This manual incorporates
detailed as well as broad information and procedures for the
management of IPE. The most important chapters of DLAM
4215.1 cover policy and procedures for:
" Inventory, accounting, recording and reporting of DOD
owned IPE.
" Plant equipment management.
" Storage and transportation of IPE.
" Development, publication and maintenance of an IPE
classification and identification system.
" Equipment maintenance, repair and rebuild/overhaul of
IPE.
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" DIPEC IPE field services (i.e., technical assistance,
quality assurance, field liaison visits, seminars and
conferences.
" IPE procurement.
" IPE quality deficiency reporting.
" Reporting and reutilization of military supply system
IPE.
E. AimN KANAGUIET
In accordance with DODD 4275.5, DODD 4215.18, and DLAM
4215.1, the United States Army documented PEP management
policy, responsibility, and procedures in chapter 5 of AR
700-90 (Army Industrial Preparedness Program). This chapter
provides guidance and policy on layaway, retention,
maintenance, modernization, and disposal of Army-owned
industrial equipment and facilities in PEPs. The Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Research, Development, and
Acquisition (ASA RD&A) has final approval authority over
establishment and recertification of PEPs in the Army
[Ref. 31]. Establishment and recertification
recommendations are provided up to the ASA RD&A by the
Commanding General, Army Material Command (CG AMC). Per AR
700-90, there are 16 requirements the CG AMC is responsible
for in the PEP management area. The most important of these
include:
o Maintain PEPs in a high state of readiness for immediate
use by the Armed Forces.
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* Maintain a current information system to provide data
needed to measure the effectiveness of meeting the
critical objective of retaining production lines for
immediate use. Verify data annually.
" Develop a plan to modernize inactive industrial
equipment in PEPs, and implement the plan as resources
permit.
" Develop a transportation/storage plan for PEPs to assure
all equipment is delivered to the planned producer when
needed.
" Annually inspect Defense industrial reserve plants on a
fiscal year basis, and report findings for presentation
to Congress and for us by the executive departments.
Many responsibilities of the CG AMC are delegated to the
United States Army Industrial Engineering Activity (IEA),
Rock Island, Illinois. IEA is a staff organization
underneath the AMC. Their responsibilities can be
summarized in three parts:
IEA provides engineering support and technical
assistance to the Headquarters AMC, Major Subordinate
Commands (MSC) and other activities on actions within
the Industrial Preparedness Program.
Develop guidance, procedures and administrative controls
for PEP management.
Perform the daily management and monitor execution of
actions and programs related to layaway of facilities,
PEPs, equipment upgrading and other programs.
As of 15 October 1990, the Army owned 92 PEPs: five
were GOGO facilities, 22 GOCO facilities, and 65 COCO
facilities. Out of these 92 facilities, 83% were ammunition
related manufacturing PEPs, 15% weapons related, and 2%
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aviation related. (See Appendix A for a complete listing of
PEPs and end items produced.)
While the Army does not classify its PEPs as active or
inactive, it classifies the IPE in the PEP as either active,
inactive or in a laid away status. Inactive IPE is
equipment that is currently not in operation, while laid
away IPE is equipment that is not operational and stored
until needed for use during surge/mobilization. IPE is
described as:
•..that part of plant equipment with an acquisition cost
of $5000 or more used for the purpose of cutting,
abrading, grinding, shaping, forming, joining, testing,
measuring, heat treating, or otherwise altering the
physical, electrical, or chemical properties of
material, components. or end item entailed in
manufacturing, maintenance, supply, processing,
areembly, or research and development operations.
[if. 30p. 1-3]
Even though PEPs are made up of ST, STE, OPE and IPE,
management attention is focused on IPE in the PEPs. Three
reasons for this are:
" IPE has a long procurement lead time
" IPE is vital to the manufacturing process
* IPE is expensive.
IPE has a long procurement lead time. It takes about
six to 21 months to determine defense requirements and
execute contract procedures for machine tools [Ref. 32]. In
order to help shorten the administrative and production lead
time, the government set up the machine tool trigger program
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(MTTOP) in the 1950's (See Chapter II History). "The
program provides for standby contracts with certain machine
tool producers so that, in the event of an emergency...,
these contractors immediately will begin manufacturing and
delivering the type and quantities of machine tools
specified in the standby contracts" [Ref. 14:p. 127]. The
program is the responsibility of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) which provides guidance on
implementation procedures.
Another reason PEP managers focus on IPE rather than
OPE, ST, and STE, is that it is vital to manufacturing. IPE
is simply the basic component of manufacturing. As
engineer, writer and historian of the machine tool industry,
Anderson Ashburn noted:
...virtually every man-made device is produced either by
machine tools or by machines and equipment produced by
machine tools. Thus an automobile is an assembly of
metal parts made by machine tools, plastic parts
produced by machines made by machine tools, fabric
produced on textile machines made by machine tools,
rubber processed and molded by equipment made on machine
tools, and glass processed by equipment produced by
machine tools. The assembly is achieved with the aid of
a variety of devices produced by machine tools. The
assembled automobile is fueled by petroleum that was
drilled for, pumped, piped, and refined with equipment
produced by machine tools and is finally driven over
highways surveyed, graded, and paved by instruments and
machinery built with machine tools. [Ref. 33]
As noted in Table 3.1, there are presently 21,483 pieces
of government-owned IPE in Army PEPs. The acquisition cost
of this IPE was 1.2 billion dollars. It would take about
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three times this amount, (3.7 billion dollars) to replace
all of the Army's IPE today.
TABLE 3.1
COSTS/QUANTITY OF ARMY IPE IN PEPS
QUANTITY ACQUISITION COST REPLACEMENT COST2
IN- 10,434 $363,697,949.00 $1,871,432,640.00
ACTIVE
IPE
ACTIVE 11,049 $837,871,355.00 $1,867,470,945.00
IPE
TOTAL 21,483 $1,201,568,304.00 $3,738,903,585.00
Use of IPE replacement costs however, can be misleading.
One reason is that there is no standard way replacement
2 Replacement cost is determined by multiplying the
original acquisition cost by a replacement cost factor. The
replacement cost factor is a figure (percent) that takes into
consideration changes in inflation over a past number of years
and adjusts it to present value. For example, a piece of 1980
metal working IPE with an acquisition cost of 100,000 dollars
would be multiplied by a replacement cost factor of 1.27 to
obtain its' present value replacement cost. The 1.27 factor
takes into account all the inflation that has occurred from 1980
to present. The factor is adjusted annually to reflect changes
in inflation. Replacement cost factors are obtained from the
Finished Goods Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics, under the
category metal working machinery and equipment. [Ref. *24]
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costs are determined. The Army and DLA for instance, use
two different methods to determine replacement costs of IPE.
Another reason replacement costs can be misleading is that
some older IPE has no basis of comparison today. In other
words, that equipment is so unique or outdated that no
company makes it or could make it.
F. PROBLMS WITH IPE AGE
As seen in Table 3.2, the majority of Army IPE (52.9%)
is over 30 years old. This is due to the fact that most of
this IPE was purchased during the Korean War
[Ref. 34]. There are several problems associated
with maintaining 30 year old IPE that can negatively affect
the readiness condition of PEPs.
First, in the event IPE over 30 years old breaks down on
a PEP production line, the spare parts to repair it may not
be available. The lack of replacement parts for old IPE is
due to machine tool companies phasing out support for older
models of IPE and manufacturers going out of business.
These things are indicative of the whole decline in the
United States machine tool industry (an industry which
dominated the world until the late 1960's). Some of the
factors which caused the decline in the United States
machine tool industry were the existence of cheaper foreign
imports of IPE and the faster diffusion of technology
outside the United States. [Ref. 33:pp. 77-81]
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The second problem in maintaining IPE over 30 years old
is the shrinking source of manpower. Since the "...current
generation of machinists is being trained on state-of-the-
art numerically controlled (computerized) equipment,"
[Ref. 35] the availability of skilled labor
required to operate outdated IPE decreases as people
relocate or retire.
Another problem in maintaining IPE over 30 years old, is
that this IPE may not be technically accurate enough to
manufacture modern munitions. This idea was expressed in a
1959 article addressing the danger of nut modernizing
machine tools for defense purposes. Titled, "Can we Prevent
a Production Pearl Harbor," the article tried to clearly
show that "you cannot have modern weapons without modern
means of production [Ref. 35:p. 33]."
TABLE 3.2
AGE OF ARMY IPE
YEAR PERCENT
1981 - 1990 12.2%
1971 - 1980 18.3%
1961 - 1970 16.6%
(?) - 1960 52.9%
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G. AMDIT OF PEP READINESS
IPE is the primary component of a PEP. As such, much of
PEP readiness can be evaluated by looking at the readiness
condition of the IPE within the PEP (discussed in more
detail in Chapters IV and V) [Ref. 34:p. 1]. This is one
thing an Inspector General audit on PEPs evaluated in 1983.
The audit focused on "whether plant equipment packages
were capable of fulfilling their assigned mobilization
production requirements for critical defense items" [Ref.
35:p. 1]. The key audit findings were that:
* Active equipment assigned to PEPs was maintained in
immediate use condition.
" Inactive equipment assigned to Army PEPs was not
maintained in immediate use condition.
The DOD Inspector General concluded that "... PEPs used in
mobilization planning for critical defense items will
require an extended period of time and a large sum of money
before being able to meet mobilization production
requirements" [Ref. 35:p. i].
One of the recommendations from the audit was that all
plant equipment assigned to a PEP should be retained at the
site of the planned producer. This recommendation came
about from the auditors' evaluation of the way the Navy
managed their plant equipment in PEPs (i.e., at the site of
the planned producer and in a ready to use condition).
Because of this, Navy PEPs are in a ready to use condition.
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H. NAVY INAGZNT
In accordance with DODD 4275.5, DODD 4215.18, and DLAM
4215.1, the United States Navy documented PEP management
policy, responsibility and procedures in the Secretary of
the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 4862.8A and Naval Material
Command Instruction (NAVMAT) 4870.23B. SECNAV Instruction
4862.8A is a broad instruction encompassing policy for the
acquisition and management of industrial resources. NAVMAT
4870.23B implements the broad policy of SECNAV 4862.8A as it
relates to plant equipment in PEPs.
Specifically, NAVMAT 4862.23B provides procedures for
selection, retention, and maintenance of Navy-owned plant
equipment (IPE and OPE), special tooling and special test
equipment in PEPs [Ref. 36]. Although the Naval
Material Command no longer exists, their instruction is
still used by the SYSCOMS for program execution and
guidance. [Ref. 37]
There 10 general provisions in NAVMAT 4862.23B which
pertain to PEP retention and maintenance. Some of the most
important provisions of NAVMAT 4862.23B, addressing
condition assessments and maintenance of IPE, are more
explicit than the Army's PEP instruction (AR 700-90). Two
examples are:
* To the maximum extent possible, efforts will be made to
obtain an accurate condition code and the operating
capability of all IPE held in mobilization reserves.
Metal-working... IPE should be analytically or
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operationally tested whenever it is economically
feasible...In all instances, equipment will be cycled
under power or manually through all of its design
functions, by the last user...
* Plant equipment held in an idle status will be subject
to regular surveillance to assure that an acceptable
level of equipment maintenance is being performed and
that the equipment can be reactivated with a minimum of
preparation.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) has final approval
authority over establishment, recertification and
disestablishment of PEPs. Recommendations for
establishment, recertification or disestablishment are
provided by the SYSCOMS directly to the ASN RD&A.
As of 15 October 1990 the Navy owned eight PEPs. Six
were GOCO facilities and two were COCO facilities. All Navy
PEPs are weapon system related production facilities.
Unlike the Army, the Navy classifies its PEPs as
operating on a warm base. This means that the entire PEP is
hooked to power and operational to the extent that it
regularly produces end items, but at a rate well below the
surge/mobilization rate. Presently, NAVSEA PEPs are
operated 40 hours a week [Ref. 38] and NAVAIR PEPs
are operated at different times throughout the year. A PEP
could be operational (40 hours a week) the first week of
each month and shut down the rest of the month. For
instance, NAVAIR PEP #731, located at Bristol, TN, operates
according to the demand for the commodity produced. The
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hours of operation at the plant can vary from 25% to 50% of
a normal 40 hour work week. Production requirements for a
month can sometimes be completed in one week. During the
other three weeks in the month, the PEP is inactive. The
Navy classifies its IPE in PEPs like the Army, active or
inactive.
TABLE 3.3
COSTS/QUANTITY OF NAVY IPE IN PEPS
QUANTITY ACQUISITION COST REPLACEMENT
COST
3
INACTIVE 403 $37,818,348.00 $186,469,336.00
ACTIVE 843 $22,566,755.00 $135,398,476.00
TOTAL 1246 $60,385,103.00 $321,867,812.00
3 The following is how DIPEC determines replacement cost
for IPE:
(Growth rate factor) (Age of IPE) = X
100
ez - Replacement cost factor (RCF)
(RCF) (Acquisition Cost of IPE) = Replacement Cost of IPE
Note: Maximum age of IPE is 39 years. The growth rate factor is
6.4 for machine tools, 3.02 for other IPE.
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As noted in Table 3.3, there are 1246 pieces of
government-owned IPE in Navy PEPs, at an acquisition cost of
more than 60 million dollars. It would take more than five
times the acquisition cost, or about 321 million dollars,
to replace all the Navy's IPE today.
As noted in the explanation of how the Army determines
replacement costs for its IPE, this figure can be
misleading. Furthermore, a comparison between Army and Navy
IPE based on their replacement costs would be inappropriate
because they use two different formulas to arrive at their
replacement costs.
I. AGE OF NAVY IPE
As seen in Table 3.4, the majority of Navy owned IPE
(75.8%), is more than 30 years old. Since the Inspector
General (IG) audit of PEPs in 1983 identified age of the
Army's inactive IPE (assigned to PEPs) as one aspect
contributing to their poor readiness condition, it was
surprising to discover that over two thirds of the Navy's
IPE in PEPs was more than 30 years old. If the age of IPE
was a factor in PEP readiness, as the IG audit noted, why
are Nay PEPs considered to be mission ready when Army PEPs
were not? The answer to this question lies in the major
difference between Army and Navy managed PEPs. Navy PEPs
are all connected to power and operational at some varying
time and production level while Army PEPs are not.
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TABLE 3.4
AGE OF NAVY IPE IN PEPS
YEAR PERCENT
1981 - 1990 5%
1971 - 1980 8.6%
1961 - 1970 10.6%
? - 1960 75.8%
TOTAL 100%
J. CONCLUSIONS
Three differences in Navy PEP management versus Army PEP
management which might account for the observed differences
in their respective readiness conditions are:
* IPE in Navy PEPs were connected to power at the planned
producer.
9 Navy policy and responsibility for PEP maintenance and
readiness was clearer than Army policy.
* There are fewer layers of organization in the Navy PEP
management chain (i.e., the Army had their PEP policy
refined by AMC, while the Navy Material Command was
disestablished years ago).
The skilled labor required to run outdated IPE is
disappearing. As companies in the United States close down,
labor relocates. There is no system in existence or planned
which tracks critical skills by individual. In the event of
mobilization, PEP planned producers will be competing with
the military and civilian business for a shrinking reserve
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of manpower. If one takes the age of IPE into
consideration, PEP contractors may be searching for the
skilled employees who know how to use this old equipment
(many of whom will be 60-70 years old).
In addition to government-owned IPE, PEPs may be
augmented by contractor-owned IPE or consist entirely of
contractor-owned IPE. Contractor-owned IPE is not subject
to government monitoring. As such, unless the equipment is
active (operating), its readiness condition is known only to
the contractor.
Due to high cost, long procurement lead time and
criticality, management has historically focused on IPE
within a PEP. This has resulted in little or no emphasis
being placed on the other 3 parts of a PEP (i.e. ST, STE,
OPE). Although responsibility for these items varies
depending on type of facility (i.e. GOGO, GOCO, COCO), there
is little evidence to suggest that we know the true
operating condition of ST, STE, and OPE or that our
machinists' will know how to use them when needed.
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IV. CONDITION ASSZSSINWT O INACTIVZ
INDUSTRIAL PLANT ZQUIPNZNT
This chapter defines condition assessments and addresses
whether condition assessments of inactive industrial plant
equipment accurately reflect the operation of the equipment.
This examination is based upon the outcome of three factors:
" An operational test of two inactive lathes by the plant
engineers at the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plan (PEP
#0224), Riverbank, California, in September, 1990.
" A partial reactivation of PEP #669 for the production of
M16 rifle bolts at Rock Island Arsenal, Rock Island,
Illinois, in April, 1986 by the United States Army
Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command, Rock Island,
Illinois.
" United State Army Audit Agency, Audit Report: HQ 87-202
on the management of PEPs, published in May 1987.
Two plant equipment package sites were also visited to
gather data: the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant in
Riverbank, California, which holds 480 pieces of industrial
plant equipment, and NI Industries, Incorporated, Norris
Division in Vernon, California, which holds 434 pieces of
industrial plant equipment [Ref. 39]. Additional
sources for data were the Seneca Army Depot in Seneca, New
York, the Industrial Engineering Activity in Rock Island,
Illinois, the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center
(DIPEC) in Memphis, Tennessee, and the National Acme
Company, Cleveland, Ohio. Gathered data includes:
51
" Rock Island Arsenal and Seneca Army Depot operational
literature.
* Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant inventory of IPE.
" IRA inventory of the Army IPE for lathes.
" Literature on Acme-Gridley Lathes from National Acme
Company.
" DIPEC information on condition assessments and condition
codes.
A. CONDITION ASSESSMENT
A condition assessment of industrial plant equipment
within the Army and Navy includes an evaluation of the
operational ability of the equipment. A two digit alpha-
numeric condition code is assigned to each piece of
industrial plant equipment. This condition code signifies
the readiness status of the equipment for use in the
production process. The first letter of the code is a
supply condition code, indicating whether or not the
machine is serviceable and the degree of serviceability.
The second character is the disposal code, indicating the
general condition of the machine and what, if any, repairs
would be needed for the equipment to be functional (see
Appendix D for the specific definitions of the condition
codes). [Ref. 40]
These condition codes have been the Department of
Defense standard for condition assessments of industrial
plant equipment since 1984. Prior to their implementation
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another condition code system was used. The Defense
Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC) issued a
conversion table in 1984 to the Industrial Engineering
Activity. Condition reassessments done since 1985 have been
under the new standard. Table 4.1 shows the 1984 DIPEC
conversion table. [Ref. 41]
TABLE 4.1
DIPEC CONDITION CODE CONVERSION TABLE
Prior 1984 1984 To Present














A problem with the current condition codes is that
several different variables have been grouped together. The
current coding scheme is trying to simultaneously measure
the:
& Degree to which the equipment can successfully do it job
or jobs.
o Amount of money needed to repair the equipment.
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" Amount of time needed to repair the equipment.
" Salvage value of the equipment.
* Estimated remaining life of the equipment.
* Need for parts to repair the equipment.
The condition codes are supposed to correctly capture
the values of these six variables. A scheme that
incorporates more digits (perhaps one for each variable)
would be more descriptive and cover the six variables more
thoroughly.
S. AC -GRZDLZY LUTMES
An inventory listing of active and inactive lathes in
Army PEPs was obtained from the Industrial Engineering
Activity (IEA), Rock Island, Illinois, the central
industrial plant equipment inventory control point for the
Army. This listing also showed the location and condition
code of each lathe. From this listing, the Acme-Gridley
eight spindle, 8" chuck, high speed automatic lathe located
at the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant was chosen for study.
This lathe was critical to the 81 mm mortar casing
production line which was inactivated and laid away in 1976.
According to Riverbank Army Ammunition plant engineers, the
line cannot manufacture mortar casings without the Acme-
Gridley lathe or a suitable substitute. The lathe was
originally produced by National Acme in Cleveland, Ohio, a
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manufacturer of lathes for over 80 years. These lathes are
advertised as being able to perform numerous operations in
short time spans while maintaining exact tolerances, having
low downtime for maintenance, short set up times, and short
tool change times. [Ref. 431 The years of
manufacture of the Acme-Gridley lathes in this study (see
Appendix E) are shown in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2
ACTIVE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
Army Total Riverbank AAP
----------------------------------------
Year of six eight six eight
Manufacture spindle spindle spindle spindle
------------------------ 
------- ------- ------- -------
1941 4 0 0 0
1942 18 0 0 0
1951 1 0 0 0
1952 3 0 1 0
1954 4 0 0 0
1961 1 0 0 0
1962 0 1 0 0
1967 1 0 0 0
1975 0 5 0 5
1976 4 3 4 3
1977 10 0 10 0
1978 4 0 4 0
1986 1 0 1 0
Total 51 9 20 8




Army Total Riverbank AAP
------------------- -------------
Year of six eight six eight
Manufacture spindle spindle spindle spindle
1941 18 0 0 0
1942 20 0 0 0
1943 6 0 0 0
1944 2 0 0 0
1945 1 1 0 0
1950 1 2 0 1
1951 18 4 1 0
1952 25 3 2 0
1953 3 7 0 0
1954 10 3 5 1
1957 0 1 0 0
1961 4 0 0 0
1962 0 1 0 0
1963 0 3 0 0
1966 4 0 0 0
1973 0 4 0 4
1978 0 1 0 0
1980 0 4 0 0
1981 2 0 0 0
Total 114 34 8 6





Total inactive 150 14
lathes
[Ref. 44]
National Acme produces four, six, and eight spindle bar
and chucking lathes with capacities (bar diameters) ranging
from 7/16" to 8". Bar lathes are so called because of the
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bar stock used to produce parts. Bar stock generally comes
in 20 foot lengths and is available in round, square,
hexagonal, or other regular polygonal cross sections. A bar
diameter refers to the maximum diameter size of bar stock
the lathe can work on. [Ref. 45] For example, a
7/16" capacity bar lathe would be able to work on a piece of
bar stock up to and including 7/16" maximum diameter.
Chucking lathes (chuckers) are different from bar lathes
only in the way the working part is held by the lathe.
Chucking lathes are equipped with devices (called chucks)
that can hold a wider range of pieces to be worked
(castings, forqings, and odd shaped items). The chuck
capacity is the maximum diameter of the widest part that the
chuck can hold. [Ref. 43:p. 2] Table 4.3 shows the number
of Acme-Gridley 8" chucking lathes owned by the Army.
TABLE 4.3
ARMY ACME-GRIDLEY 8" CHUCK LATHE INVENTORY
Army Total Riverbank AAP
Number of
spindles active inactive active inactive
eight 8 9 8 6
six 5 10 5 8
four 0 0 0 0
Total 13 19 13 14
[Ref. 46]
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The Acme-Gridley multiple spindle lathes use a process
to manufacture parts which performs different machining
operations at sequential spindle work stations without
removing the part from the lathe. The part is usually
machined to within minute tolerances of given
specifications. Multiple spindle lathes work several pieces
of stock at a time, one per spindle. Once the part is
loaded on a lathe spindle, it is rotated or indexed through
different work stations on the lathe. The time it takes to
produce a part on multiple spindle lathes is less than the
time required for the same operations on a single spindle
lathe. For instance, on a single spindle lathe the machine
has to be stopped, setup, and restarted for each of the
three operations that a multiple spindle lathe could perform
without stopping. Multiple spindle lathes are more
efficient due to a faster production time per part [Ref.
43:p. 2].
Acme-Gridley lathes at Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant
are used for the manufacture of 81 mm and 60 mm mortar
casings. Roughly forged casings are machined to exacting
tolerances on the eight and six spindle Acme-Gridley chuck
lathes. The casings are then shipped to another
manufacturer for the loading of explosives and final
manufacturing processes.
Machining operations by the Acme-Gridley eight spindle
chuck lathes on the 81 mm and 60 mm mortar casings are
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performed in two stages. The first stage consists of
loading the casing, turning the conical nose, facing or
making the head of the casing flush, drilling a center hole
in the head, and unloading. The second stage, performed on
another lathe in the production line, consists of loading,
turning the open end, facing the open end, chamfering, and
unloading (see Appendix F). There are three ammunition
lines at Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant which have Acme-
Gridley lathes. The Acme-Gridley lathes on line one in the
Riverbank Plant are active, and are currently able to
produce 1000 81 mm or 60 mm mortar casings an hour. The
Acme-Gridley lathes on line 7 have been inactive since 1976,
and line 13 since April, 1990. [Ref. 47]
C. CONDZTION ASSZSSNUNTS OF AOA-GRIDLEY L&TBES
The condition assessments that were done in 1985-1989
for the Acme-Gridley lathes in the Army's and Riverbank
Ammunition Plant's industrial plant equipment inventories
all fell into one of the categories listed in Table 4.4.
59
TABLE 4.4
NUMBER OF LATHES IN EACH CATEGORY
Army Riverbank
A6 - 18 1
A5 - 128 30
A4 - 42 10
Al - 1 1
F9 - 4 0
F8 - 15 0
F7 - 2 0
Total 210 42
[Ref. 48]
In the course of this study, it was found that the
Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant lathes were assessed only by
visual means during the last condition reassessment in 1985.
The actual working condition of the lathes on inactivated
line seven is thus unknown. They haven't been started for
approximately 15 years. Therefore, the condition
assessments of these inactive lathes may be substantially
inaccurate.
Table 4.5 lists the condition codes for the 60 active
and 150 inactive Army Acme-Gridley lathes. Note that 90%
(134) of the inactive lathes and 88% (53) of the active
lathes are estimated to be in serviceable condition. Also,
all the Acme-Gridley lathes at Riverbank Army Ammunition
Plant are in serviceable condition (i.e. may be used without
repair). This condition assessment of the inactive lathes
is questionable because the inactive equipment assessments




OF SIX AND EIGHT SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
Army:
Active A6 A5 A4 Al F9 F8 F7
eight spindle 0 9 0 0 0 0 0
six spindle 1 30 12 1 0 7 0
four spindle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 39 12 1 0 7 0 60
Inactive A6 A5 A4 Al F9 F8 F7
eight spindle 2 25 3 0 1 2 1
six spindle 13 65 26 0 3 6 1
four spiidle 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 17 90 29 0 4 8 2 150
Riverbank AAP:
Active A6 A5 A4 Al F9 F8 F7
eight spindle 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
six spindle 1 8 10 1 0 0 0
four spindle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1 16 10 1 0 0 0 28
Inactive A6 A5 A4 Al F9 F8 F7
eight-spindle 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
six spindle 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
four spindle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 14 0 0 0 0 0 14
[Ref. 46]
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The cost of connecting the inactive equipment to electrical
power and turning it on is considered to be too high by the
assessment teams. Therefore, alternative, visual
inspections are performed. In essence then, the evaluation
of the equipments' ability to operate is based solely upon
external appearances. [Ref. 47]
D. TESTS BY RXVER&k= APMY AMMUNITION PLANT
A test of two inactive Acme-Gridley eight spindle, 8"
chucking lathes was conducted by the industrial engineering
manager for Norris Industries at the Riverbank Army
Ammunition Plant in September 1990. The test consisted of
starting the lathes and machining 81 mm mortar case forgings
to within the specified engineering tolerances. After
machining, the mortar casings were checked to see if the
government tolerances were met.
These inactive lathes are part of the inactivated 81 mm
and 60 mm mortar casing production line (line 7). This
inactivated line has 5 eight spindle and 7 six spindle Acme-
Gridley lathes. The lathes were preserved and laid away in
1976 and were assigned condition codes of A5 (may be used
without repair) after the last condition reassessment in
1985. As seen in Table 4.5, all inactive Acme-Gridley
lathes at Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant are rated in ready
to use (A5) condition. According to the engineering
manager, these lathes were last operated in 1973 when
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Riverbank AAP conducted a full power mobilization test run,
soon after Vietnam war production ceased.
Z. MRMZN CAPABXLITY
A progression of activities was required to start the
first Acme-Gridley lathe (serial number 341636898). These
activities including cleaning the lathe, checking the
lubrication levels in the automatic lubrication device, and
connecting power to the machine's circuits. This process
took approximately 32 man hours to accomplish (Kumar, 1990,
Personal Interview). [Ref. 49] The lathe started
and three machining tests were run. The tests and
specifications were:
" Max TIR (total indicator reading) - this indicator
measures the amount of imperfection in the roundness of
the hole drilled in the boss head. The engineering
specification is 0.000 to 0.020 inches.
" Boss height - the height of the boss end after being
machined into the body of the mortar casing (see
Appendix E). The engineering specification is 0.877 +/-
0.007 inches.
* Bulkhead thickness - This measures the thickness of the
mortar casing wall. The engineering specification is
0.165 +/- 0.005 inches.
Each test produced an indication of the ability of the
lathe to produce parts within the given tolerances. This
indicator is called the machine capability (CpK) and
measures how closely the lathe can match the process
capability (Cp). The process capability measures the
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production capability within the specified tolerances.
Process capability is defined as:
Cp - USL - LSL / 6S
where, USL is the upper engineering specification limit
LSL is the lower engineering specification limit
6S is 6 times the process standard deviation.
The engineering specifications are the given upper and lower
limits of the required measurement. An example of the
engineering specification for the boss height is a target
measurement of 0.877 inches for each mortar casing with an
upper limit of 0.884 inches, and a lower limit of 0.870
inches. The natural specification is the average sample
standard deviation, which is denoted as S, times 6. Due to
the small size of the sample, the average standard deviation
was used as an estimator for each test instead of the
standard deviation that would have been obtained if a much
larger sample, say several hundred, had been taken. The
process is considered capable of producing parts within the
given specifications if the Cp indicator is equal to or
greater than 1.0.
The machine capability, CpK, indicates whether the lathe
at its current settings can produce enough parts within the
upper and lower limits of a given specific measurement to
warrant using it in a production cycle. The performance of
an individual lathe depends upon the performance of its
worst spindle. Therefore, a determination of the lathe's
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capability for consistently producing parts within the
engineering specifications is made by computing two CpK
values using the highest spindle mean for one, and the
lowest spindle mean for the other. Table 4.6 lists the test
results from which the CpK calculations were made.
TABLE 4.6
LATHE TEST RESULTS FROM RIVERBANK AMMUNITION PLANT
Max Total Indicator Reading (TIR):
Spindle Sample Average Standard
number size (X) deviation
1 12 0.01500 0.00481
2 14 0.00829 0.00287
3 12 0.00717 0.00422
4 14 0.01321 0.00396
5 12 0.00925 0.00439
6 14 0.00721 0.00389
7 11 0.00727 0.00347




Spindle Sample Average Standard
number size (X) deviation
1 14 0.87639 0.00312
2 14 0.87429 0.00091
3 14 0.87650 0.00259
4 14 0.87550 0.00109
5 14 0.87643 0.00224
6 14 0.87729 0.00149
7 14 0.87743 0.00206





Spindle Sample Average Standard
number size (X) deviation
1 12 0.16146 0.00086
2 12 0.16279 0.00096
3 11 0.16091 0.00120
4 12 0.16354 0.00114
5 12 0.16104 0.00127
6 12 0.16563 0.00064
7 12 0.16254 0.00110
8 12 0.16467 0.00117
Sample Average 0.00100
Standard Deviation
An example of the X3 and X, used for computing the CpK
for the boss height test is spindle number seven, with the
high average of 0.87743 inches, and spindle number two, with
the low average of 0.87429. Two CpK values were computed
using these two means separately. The underlying assumption
that the plant engineers follow is that the lathe produces
parts in a stable and controlled manner with all the
measurements falling within the engineering specification
limits. Additionally, the engineers assume that the
average of the observations for a spindle (X) approximately
follows a normal distribution; this is due to the central
limit theorem. The formulas are as:
CpK - Min (A, B), where
A - (Upper Engineering Specification Limit (USL) - XR) / 3S
where X. denotes the largest average spindle mean
and
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B - (XL - Lower Engineering Specification Limit (LSL)) / 3S
where XL denotes the lowest average spindle mean.
CpK is the smallest of A and B and indicates the lathe's
capability of producing parts within the given tolerances.
The measurements used to determine the machines production
capability are:
CpK >- 1.33, good
1.0 <- CpK < 1.33, marginal
CpK < 1.0, unsatisfactory
r. TEST RESULTS
The first lathe tested (serial number 341636898)
started, but the mortar casings it produced failed to meet
government specifications by having CpK indicators below 1.0
for all three tests. The CpK indicators for the three tests
were as:
Max Total Indicator Reading (TIR):
The Max TIR reading cannot go below 0.00 because
negative values are infeasible. Therefore, only the upper




For Max TIR data from table 4.7, the CpK' is:
0.020 - 0.01500




Xg = 0.87743, XX = 0.87429, S = 0.00197
0.884 - 0.87743
A = --------------- =1.11
(3) (0.00197)
0.87429 - 0.870




Xg - 0.16563, XL - 0.16091, S - 0.001
0.170 - 0.16563
A = --------------- 1.45
(3) (0.001)
0.16091 - 0.160
B = --------------- = 0.30
(3) (0.001)
CpK = 0.30
The test results show that all three CpK values are
below 1.0. These unsatisfactory CpK values indicated that
the machine process would not be capable of producing enough
parts within the given tolerances to warrant using the lathe
in production. A closer examination revealed that two of
the lathe spindles needed bearing replacements. The lathe
was not in serviceable condition, while its A5 condition
code indicated it was. Presently this lathe is still
inoperative and extensive repairs are needed before this
particular lathe can operate within specifications.
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The second lathe (serial number 341630305) did not start
at all. After diagnosis and disassembly, all the bearings
were found to need replacement. Clearly this lathe was also
in unserviceable condition, again contrary to the assessed
condition code.
The engineer in charge of the tests at Riverbank stated
that the bearing problems were probably due to the absence
of lubrication over the long storage periods without
operation.
These lathes have an automatic lubrication system that
operates only when the lathe is in operation. No
alternative lubrication system was put into place during
storage. Evidently, the weight of the "pindles resting on
the bearings, combined with the lack of adequate lubrication
over time, caused the bearings to form pressure scratches
and also lose their spherical shape (flatten). [Ref. 47]
This bearing problem could occur with all similar inactive
lathes in the Army inventory.
However, the assessed condition codes of both lathes
tested at Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant indicated that the
equipment should have been in usable condition (A). The
engineering manager conducting the operating tests stated
that the assigned condition codes do not have much meaning
as the codes do not reflect the current actual working
condition of the equipment, only the working condition at
the time it was last used.
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G. RTACTIVATION OF PZP-669
A similar bearing problem was found on a 1.25" bar
diameter Acme-Gridley eight spindle chucker during the
partial reactivation of plant equipment package (PEP) 669 in
May 1986. This PEP is located at the Rock Island Arsenal,
Rock Island, Illinois, and manufactures M16 rifle bolt
assemblies. Reactivation showed four of twenty nine pieces
of inactive equipment, including one Acme-Gridley eight
spindle 1.25" chucking lathe, to have major spindle bearing
problems due to corrosion. This problem delayed the PEP
reactivation until repairs could be made.
[Ref. 50]
Table 4.7 shows the Army's inventory of Acme-Gridley six
and eight spindle bar/chucking lathes (similar to the ones
at Rock Island Arsenal). Although smaller than the two
lathes tested at Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, the
chucking lathes in PEP-669 had the same type of problem
during reactivation; the bearings had gone bad over time.
Based on these observations, it is reasonable to hypothesize
that similar inactive lathes under similar storage and
environmental conditions could have similar bearing
problems. These bearing problems would therefore cause
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H. ARMY AUDIT O PLANT EQUIPbMNT PACKAGES
The U.S. Army Audit Agency published an audit report on
the management of plant equipment packages in May 1987. The
audit was performed to evaluate the actions taken by Army
management to eliminate previously identified problems that
related to monitoring the maintenance and controlling the
deterioration of inactive industrial plant equipment in
storage. The audit, performed from October 1986 through
February 1987, was made in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. However,
information related to the analytical methods used, the
methodology, or how the auditors defined deterioration was
not given in the audit report.
The report stated that the data base used for the Army's
industrial plant equipment inventory is not adequate to
identify problems related to the deterioration of industrial
plant equipment in plant equipment packages. It found that
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no method had been established to identify the effects of
equipment age, length of inactivity due to storage, and
maintenance procedures on industrial plant equipment held in
PEPs. The Army audit analysis, performed by the Industrial
Engineering Activity and the Seneca Army Depot for the years
1985 to 1987, found that many of the recorded condition
codes of the 4152 pieces of industrial plant equipment were
inaccurate, and that plans for rebuilding or replacing
equipment will be outdated before execution.
[Ref. 51] Again, a discussion as to what this
analysis entailed was not given in the audit report.
The audit report cited a previous DOD Inspector General
report which estimated that 80% of inactive industrial plant
equipment would require overhaul or repair before use. This
estimate came from a 1978 study made by the Industrial Base
Engineering Activity (now Industrial Engineering Activity).
The Industrial Base Engineering Activity study was based on
data accumulated for 2,447 pieces of industrial plant
equipment assigned to 5 PEPs brought into DoD industrial
plant equipment maintenance facilities for inspection and
test. The statistical data compiled showed that 1,984 of
the total number of items were recorded in ready to use
without repair condition (Al through A6). However,
condition assessment tests confirmed that only 463 of the
2,447 items (about 20%) required no repair.
72
[Ref. 52] The remainder required repair despite
their condition code indicating otherwise.
The DoD Inspector General further stated that industrial
plant equipment assigned to Army-managed plant equipment
packages, "was not generally being maintained in a condition
capable of providing the additional production capability
that will be needed to fulfill mobilization requirements."
[Ref. 51:p. 3]
I. ARMY AUDIT REPORT CONCLUSION
The audit report contends that the actual condition of
inactive industrial plant equipment is probably worse than
the condition codes indicate. [Ref. 51:p. 2] If the Army
Audit Agency report is correct, between 80% to 100% of
inactive Acme-Gridley lathes (120 to 150) will need repair
before use. Mobilization planning, however, does not allow
the time necessary for these repairs. This report is
compared to table 4.5 which shows that only 10% of the
Army's inactive Acme-Gridley lathes have condition codes
indicating a need for repair or overhaul.
J. CONCLUSION
Based on testing and audit reports, it is felt that the
condition codes of the industrial plant equipment examined
in this thesis were overstated. The codes do not accurately
indicate the actual operability of the equipment nor the
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degree to which inactive industrial plant equipment can be
readily used to meet surge and mobilization requirements.
As the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant tests, the
reactivation of PEP-669, and the Army audit report show,
condition codes do not necessarily indicate the actual
working state of the equipment. The results of these three
factors are summarized in Table 4.8.
TABLE 4.8
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FOR THE CONDITION CODE FACTORS
Number in Al-A6 Number
Sample condition before actually in
Audit/Test size before audit/test A1-A6 condition
Riverbank
AAP Test 2 2 0
PEP 669
Reactivation 29 29 25
1987 Army
Audit 2,447 1,984 463
Documentation, from the additional sources noted above,
combine to support the hypothesis that similar inactive
lathes under similar conditions will have the same bearing
problems, from lack of lubrication and lack of operation.
As a result, inactive Acme-Gridley inactive six and eight
spindle lathes will have problems operating on short notice
and will not be able to meet mobilization and surge
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requirements for increased production of critically needed
war material in a timely manner.
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V. CONDITION ASSESSMENT PJOCEDURZS
This chapter examines the procedure used for condition
assessments of inactive Army IPE and estimates the costs
associated with an alternative procedure that may lead to
more accurate assessments. This examination is based upon
six factors:
" Operational test of inactive Acme-Gridley lathes at
Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant.
" Army PEP examinations.
" Personal Interviews.
" Industrial Engineering Activity briefing.
* Command Review of Industrial Base (CRIB) Survey of the
Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, Riverbank, California.
" CRIB survey of NI Industries, Vernon, California.
A. PURPOSE OF CONDITION ASSESSMNTS
The purpose of a condition assessment is to determine
the operating condition of IPE so that appropriate
maintenance actions can be taken to insure that PEPs are in
ready to use condition (DoDD 4275.5 and other management
directives). Equipment that is not in working condition can
affect a PEP's ability to meet surge/ mobilization
requirements. Information about non-working IPE can be used
to make critical management decisions affecting PEP
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operations. Management decisions concerning IPE typically
involve choosing from alternatives such as:
[Ref. 53]
* Retain the equipment in its current condition.
" Make minor repairs.
" Retrofit the equipment with state-of-the-art features.
" Rebuild or purchase new equipment.
B. ARMY COMU&NDS THAT DO CONDITION ASSZSSMENTS
Several Army Commands can update the condition codes of
inactive IPE. The codes can be updated at any time to
reflect changes in the operational condition of the IPE.
Changes are submitted to the Defense Industrial Plant
Equipment Center for inclusion in the IPE data base. The
commands that do condition assessments on IPE are:
* United States Army Industrial Engineering Activity (IEA)
at the Rock Island Arsenal Island Illinois.
* The Industrial Readiness Directorate (IRD) also at the
Rock Island Arsenal.
" The Seneca Army Depot at Seneca, New York.
" The Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC),
Memphis, Tennessee. [Ref. 54]




The condition assessment program for inactive IPE began
in early 1985 following the DoD inspector general's
determination that Army PEPs were not in adequate condition
to meet immediate mobilization/surge requirements. (Ref.
53 :p. 18] The Defense Industrial Reserve Act of 1973 stated
that PEP IPE will be in a ready to use condition. Funding
was made available for the condition assessment of the
Army's IPE. Once the condition assessments were made, the
information was entered into the Army's IPE data base.
[Ref. 53:p. 19]
The condition assessments of the Army's central IPE
storage sites were completed in May, 1988. The condition
assessments of contractor owned and operated PEPs are
currently being conducted, with expected completion in
fiscal year 1991. Industrial Engineering Activity condition
assessment trips to date are described in Table 5.1. [Ref.
53:p. 12]
TABLE 5.1
INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY ASSESSMENT TRIPS
FY85 FY86 FY87 FY88 FY89 Total
No. of trips: 17 20 12 13 14 76
Items assessed: 3944 4498 1516 3328 2382 15,668
No. of mandays: 165 157 80 86 95 583
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D. CONDITION ASSRSSMZNTS OF ARMY ZQUIPMNT
The Army's inactive IPE in PEPs is not operationally
tested unless power is connected to it. Inactive equipment
is not usually connected to power. The reason for this
policy is that there is not adequate funding available to
connect the equipment to power, operationally test,
disconnect from power, and preserve the equipment for
storage (i.e. place it in a condition that prevents
environmental deterioration). Other reasons are as:
" Lack of technical expertise in the operation of the
inactive equipment.
" Time requirements for the assessment team to
operationally test the equipment.
" Contract modifications.
[Ref. 56]
The check-off list used by the Industrial Engineering
Activity to grade the condition of inactive IPE is shown in
Appendix F. Several of the listed systems can not be




" Hydraulic, Pneumatic Systems.
" Spindle Driving Heads.
" Transmission Systems.
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Z. CRIB SURVEY8 AT NI INDUSTRIES AND FAIVREBAN NK iUNITION
PLANT
Recertification of PEPs to meet mobilization
requirements is periodically done by a Command Review of
Industrial Base (CRIB), or CRIB survey. CRIB surveys are
performed by the Industrial Readiness Directorate
Headquarters, United States Army Armament, Munitions and
Chemical Command, Rock Island, Illinois.
CRIB surveys were completed on PEP 0224 located at the
Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant in May, 1985, and on PEP
0098 located at NI Industries in December, 1989. A written
report was furnished for each survey. The reports included
some condition code updates for the inactive IPE located at
each site.
Operational tests of the inactive equipment at both
sites were not performed. The reason for not operationally
testing the equipment was not given in the reports. The
plant property manager at NI, and the engineering manager at
Riverbank stated that time constraints on the survey teams
and the added expense of cleaning and operating the
equipment were the reason that operational testing was not
done. [Ref. 57]
The purpose and scope of the NI Industries CRIB survey
were:
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" Purpose - NI Industries, Inc., was surveyed to determine
their readiness posture in the event of mobilization and
to verify whether the contractor is capable of producing
the planned items at the planned rates within the
required time frame.
* Scope - To investigate the company's production
capability by reviewing each Description of Manufacture
(DOM) and inspecting the production equipment,
production line voids, subcontractor planning, and
personnel availability.
[Ref. 58]
The NI Industries CRIB survey stated that a visual
inspection was done on the government-owned equipment
located on site, and that the majority of the equipment
appeared to be maintained in accordance with current
maintenance procedures. [Ref. 58, p.7]
An example of how some CRIB teams update and change
condition codes can be derived from this survey. NI
Industries was directed by their procurement contracting
officer (Industrial Engineering Activity, Rock Island,
Illinois) to return six items for disposal due to poor
condition. However, according to the contractor, the
equipment was either being used in production or was capable
of being used. These items are shown in Table 5.2.
81
TABLE 5.2
NI INDUSTRIES CRIB SURVEY CONDITION CODE CHANGES
Old New
Condition Condition Serial
Equipment Code Code Number
1. Phosphate Coat, A6 A5 342600416
Lefort.
2. Press, Hyd., 100T. F8 A4 344200386
3. Press, Hyd., 700T. A6 A5 344205692
4. Press, Hyd., 125T. F9 A4 344205694
5. Trim, machine, A6 A4 344901223
CTG, Case.
6. Blaster, Pangborn. F8 A5 358500871
[Ref. 58: pp. 210-218]
The procurement contracting officer's decision to remove
these six pieces of equipment from the plant was based
solely on the then current condition codes
[Ref. 59]. According to the survey report, the
upgrades were done based only on visual inspections. The
report stated that the equipment appeared to be in better
operating condition than the existing codes indicated and
recommended the equipment disposal action be rescinded.
[Ref. 58: p. 8] However, this could mean that the assessed
condition codes assigned by other condition assessment teams
do not reflect the actual operating condition of the
equipment due to the Army's visual assessment policy.
The purpose and scope of the Riverbank Army Ammunition
Plant CRIB survey were as:
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" PurPiose - To determine the readiness posture in the
event of mobilization and to determine if the facility
is capable of producing the planned items at the planned
rates within the required time frames.
" Scope - To review the plant's capability by an on site
inspection of the production facility, methods and
techniques of operation, and the latest plant layout.
[Ref. 60]
The test of the operability of the two inactive Acme-
Gridley lathes at Riverbank Ammunition Plant discussed in
chapter IV proved that the two lathes were not in the
serviceable condition that their assigned condition codes
indicated. The visual condition assessments of the inactive
IPE at Riverbank done by the Industrial Readiness
Directorate did not change the lathes' assigned condition
codes. The lathes' condition codes indicated that they were
operational when they were not. A power test of the two
Acme-gridley lathes, which were later tested for operability
by NI Industry personnel, would have found that they were
inoperable and repair could have been scheduled. Not power
testing the two lathes gave misleading information to
decision makers about the operability of the lathes, and the
readiness of the inactivated mortar line to be reactivated.
Decisions relating to the nation's ability to meet its
planned mobilization requirements may not adequately account
for PEP reactivation delays caused by inoperable IPE without
prior operational testing.
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r. ACNm-GRIDLZY LATHES CONDITION ASSESSMENT COST
IPE condition assessment costs to the United States
government largely consist of the travel expenses incurred
for sending an assessment team from the team's home office
to the IPE site. Travel expenses per individual consist of
the airline round trip ticket, meals, lodging, and one
rental car per team. [Ref. 61]
The CRIB survey teams at Riverbank Ammunition Plant and
NI Industries consisted of government general schedule (GS)
employees. The 1990 per diem rates for the PEP sites that
were visited are shown in Table 5.3.
TABLE 5.3
1990 PER DIEM RATES
Los Angeles, California Modesto, California
(NI Industries) (Riverbank AAP)
Lodging $86.00 per day $54.00 per day
Meals $34.00 per day $26.00 per day
Total $120.00 $80.00
The approximate cost of the CRIB surveys at Riverbank
and NI Industries included the salaries of the GS employees






(3 man team) (2 man team)
Airline tickets at $600.00 $400.00
$200.00 each.
Per diem for 12 days $4,320.00 $1,920.00
at survey site.
Rental car for 12 days $240.00 $240.00
at $20.00 per day.
Total $5,160.00 $2,760.00
The cost to the United States Government of the
condition assessment of the Acme-Gridley lathes at Riverbank
was the cost of the trip. However, as shown in chapter IV,
these visual assessments were inaccurate. A power operating
test of the lathes would be necessary to determine the
lathes true operating capabilities.
Q. COST Or OPFRATIONAL TESTING TME ACM-GRIDLY LATHES
The costs involved in operationally testing the Acme-
Gridley lathes at the Riverbank ammunition plant would be
the costs of travel, labor and material. The labor costs
would entail two contractor employees working two eight hour
shifts (32 hours total) to clean and prepare the both lathes
for a power test. Table 4.1 shows that there are 6 inactive
eight spindle Acme-Gridley lathes and 8 inactive six spindle
lathes at the Riverbank plant. Table 5.5 shows the
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estimated cost to prepare these lathes for a power test.
[Ref. 49]
TABLE 5.5
COST TO PREPARE INACTIVE LATHES FOR A POWER TEST
$50.00/hour x 32 hours = $1,600.00 per lathe
14 inactive lathes x $1,600.00 per lathe = $22,400.00
Total = $22,400.00
The material cost includes lubrication, oil, and
electricity and would be less than $50.00 per lathe (Ref.
49]. The plant engineer recommends cycling each lathe once
a month to lubricate the bearings and prevent bearing damage
from reoccurring. Once the lathes were proven to be
operational, a monthly operation of 20 minutes with 40
minutes preparation time would keep the lathes in ready to
use condition. Table 5.6 shows the estimated labor costs
for this monthly maintenance:
TABLE 5.6
MONTHLY LATHE MAINTENANCE COST
$50.00/hour x 1 man hour labor - $50.00 per lathe
14 lathes x $50.00 per lathe = $700.00 a month
Total - $700.00 per month
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H. CURENIT CO1DITION ASSZSSMINT PROCZDURES
Visual condition assessments are the least cost method
for assessing the condition of IPE, but are also the least
accurate. [Ref. 52] The cost of the visual inspection of
the inactive IPE at the Riverbank AAP by the CRIB survey
team was approximately $2,760.00 as shown in table 5.4. The
savings to the Army of using visual condition assessments
for the Acme-Gridley lathes at Riverbank was the $22,400.00
cost of operationally testing the lathes as shown in table
5.5. Other costs associated with visually assessments of
IPE are as:
e Lathes won't work when called upon.
* Cost of expedited repairs during national emergency.
Operationally testing the Acme-Gridley lathes at
Riverbank have several beneficial outcomes. The
outcomes are as:
* Condition codes of the lathes would be accurate.
" The lathes are proven to perform.
0 Needed repairs can be scheduled and budgeted for
gradually, as needed.
The scheduling of repairs found during operational tests
of inactive IPE is one of the biggest advantages of this
alternative condition assessment procedure. Repairs
accomplished in a peacetime environment do not have the
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increased costs of repair that they would have during a
national emergency. Mobilization time requirements dictate
expediting the repair effort for IPE needed to increase the
production of critical war material. Extra shifts at the
production site, over-time, and the expedited shipment of
parts are some of the costs that can be avoided with early
detection of needed IPE repairs. Additionally, this
alternative procedure would allow time to order and receive
hard to get repair parts, if necessary, to accomplish
repair. This alone avoids delay from ordering repair parts
with long lead times.
I. COST O REPAIR
The costs to repair the two unserviceable inactive Acme-
Gridley lathes at Riverbank are shown in Table 5.7.
TABLE 5.7
COST OF REPAIR OF THE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
Labor:
Teardown:
40 man hours per lathe x 2 lathes = 80 hrs
Build up:
80 man hours per lathe x 2 lathes = 160 hrs
Total labor cost:
240 hrs x $50.00/hr = $12,000.00
Material:
New bearings = $16,000.00 per lathe
Total = $32,000.00
Grand Total = $44,000.00.
[Ref. 471
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The cost of expediting the repair of these lathes if
discovered to be inoperable during the reactivation of line
7 during mobilization would require the same amount of
manhours per lathe. However, overtime costs would most
likely be incurred for work done beyond a normal work day.
Delay in reactivation of line 7 would be another problem.
The plant engineering manager at Riverbank estimated that
the repair of the lathes would take at least ten calendar
days to accomplish. The assumption for this time estimate
is that needed parts are available at the manufacturer, that
the parts can be expeditiously shipped to the plant, and
that repair efforts are adequate to repair the lathes.
Table 5.8 lists the order of repair activities. [Ref. 49]
TABLE 5.8
PROGRESSION OF LATHE REPAIR ACTIVITIES DURING MOBILIZATION
Start up Check out Order Parts Receive Parts Install test
1 day 1 day 1 day 3 days 3 days 1 day
Total of 10 days.
The availability of repair parts is the factor that is
least certain in the progression of lathe repair activities.
Currently, the manufacturer of the Acme-Gridley eight
spindle lathe tested and repaired at Riverbank AAP, National
Acme, has a limited supply of the spindle roller bearings
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needed to make that repair. Table 5.9 shows the current
manufacturer availability of these bearings.
TABLE 5.9
CURRENT AVAILABILITY OF SPINDLE ROLLER BEARINGS
On hand at On order at
Bearing manufacturer manufacturer
front,






The repair of the Acme-Gridley lathes at Riverbank AAP
required one front set (a set consists of eight bearings),
eight front individual, and eight rear bearings for each
lathe. At present, the bearing supply shown in Table 5.9
would only repair nine Acme-Gridley eight spindle lathes if
all eight front individual bearings needed replacement, two
if all eight rear individual bearings needed replacement,
and none if the front bearing set needed replacement. The
lead time for replacement orders placed by National Acme
with the bearing manufacturer could take up to six months.
[Ref. 62] The administrative lead time would not be a
critical factor in ordering the repair parts because the
facilities contract that NI Industries has with the
government to operate the Riverbank AAP allows direct
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ordering of repair parts from the manufacturer for repair of
government owned IPE. However, IEA approval is necessary
before any order can be place. During mobilization,
approval from IEA would be forthcoming for the repair of
critically needed IPE. [Ref. 63]
The lathes are one component of line 7 at Riverbank.
The other inactive IPE on the line could face similar
reactivation problems, further delaying the reactivation.
Current mobilization planning does not take into account
these time delays for the mobilization plan is based upon
condition assessments of PEP IPE that indicate the equipment
is ready to use without delay. The Acme-Gridley lathes were
not in serviceable condition and this could indicate that
there will be reactivation problems if line 7 at Riverbank
is reactivated.
J. CONPARISON
A cost comparison of the current (visual) and
alternative (power testing) procedures of condition
assessing IPE are shown in Table 5.10. This comparison of
testing procedures is for the Riverbank AAP only. A similar
type of analysis done for all the IPE the Army owns would be


















test casings 0.00 400.00
Total $2,760.00 $11,560.00
The cost of repair of the lathes ($44.000.00) would be
the same under both procedures (Table 5.7) if the PEP is
activated. However, the possibility of additional costs for
expedited repair of the lathes during mobilization would be
avoided, as would a delay in the production of critical war
material, by using the alternative procedure due to earlier
detection of IPE repair needs. The TDY cost for the two man
assessment team and for the IPE storage space is the same
for both procedures. The cost to machine and measure test
casings is one manday at $50.00 per hour for eight hours.
Under the assumption that the inactive lathes would
never be needed the best alternative for assessing the
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condition of inactive IPE is the current procedure.
However, the Riverbank AAP mobilization plan calls for the
full PEP production of war material within three to nine
months of full mobilization. Condition assessments of PEP
IPE using the alternative (power testing) procedure will
give decision makers more accurate information on the
capability of the PEP to meet these mobilization time
requirements then the current (visual) procedures.
K. CONCLUSION
The current condition assessment procedures used by the
Army do not accurately test the operational ability of
inactive IPE in Army PEPs. The practice of visually
inspecting equipment may be the least cost method for doing
condition assessments of IFE, but it is also the least
accurate. Army PEP readiness based on the assessed
condition of the PEP's inactive IPE leaves much uncertainty
about the ability of the PEP to be reactivated in the
planned time frames during surge/mobilization.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RMCOMMMDATIONS
The primary research question of this thesis was whether
inactive PEPs are a viable resource for industrial
mobilization. Use of the terminology inactive PEP is
incorrect. Thus, the real primary research question should
be whether all PEPs are a viable option for meeting
surge/mobilization production requirements.
After studying PEP management by the Services, we found
that the primary research question was stated incorrectly
due to the different way each service (i.e. Army and Navy)
classify PEPs. For example, the Navy classifies the IPE in
PEPs as active or inactive, and considers Navy owned PEPs to
be active (i.e. hooked to power and operated at various
times and production rates below the surge/mobilization
rates). The Army, on the other hand, classifies only the IPE
in PEPs as either active, inactive, or laid away. The Army
does not refer to its PEPs as active or inactive. Neither
the Army or Navy PEP/IPE terminology is incorrect. The
Army's original intent, back in the 1950's (see Chapter 2),
was to retain the capability to manufacture critical defense
items under Service cognizance in the event of
surge/mobilization. There is no law or instruction found
which indicates that PEPs or IPE must be inactive or active.
As long as there is a mobilization requirement for PEPs to
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satisfy and money to support them, PEPs will remain a part
of our defense industrial capability. However, as funding
becomes harder to obtain, the viability and cost
effectiveness of PEPs will be more carefully scrutinized by
Congress.
A. CONCLUSIONS
Based on our analysis and prior audits, the following
conclusions are submitted.
Conclusion 1: PEPs that are connected to power and
tested (either cycled or used at some level of production)
on a regular basis, are viable options for
surge/mobilization. These PEPs have already demonstrated
that the four critical elements of a PEP (i.e., IPE, ST,
STE, OPE) are in a working condition and that there is at
least some of the required skilled labor available to train
new personnel in the event of surge/mobilization. Two
potential problems this type of PEP operation may face in
the event of reactivation, however, are: the availability of
an adequate supply of personnel; and finding sources of
repair parts for PEP equipment maintenance.
Conclusion 2: PEPs that are not connected to power and
tested (either cycled or at some level of production) on a
regular basis, are not viable option for surge/mobilization.
These PEPs will most likely not be able to meet mobilization
time requirements. PEP mobilization plans are based on the
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presumption that all the elements in a PEP will be available
and in working condition when surge/mobilization occurs.
Unless the PEP has been run through complete power tests,
this presumption may be incorrect and could lead to inactive
PEP reactivation delays which mobilization planning does not
foresee.
Conclusion 3: Visual condition assessments of inactive
IPE in PEPs do not give a good indication of the equipments'
true working condition.
The condition codes for the IPE examined in this thesis
were overstated. The codes do not indicate the actual
operability of the equipment, nor the degree to which
inactive IPE can be readily used to meet surge and
mobilization requirements. This is based on the following
studies: 1) the Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant tests on
IPE in 1990; 2) the reactivation of PEP-669 in 1987; 3) the
Army audit report on the management of PEPs published in
1987; and 4) the DOD 7 spector General audit on PEPs in
1984. The practice of visually inspecting equipment may be
the least cost .-thod of condition assessment, but it is
also the least accurate. PEP readiness based on the
visually assessed condition of its inactive IPE, leaves much
doubt about the ability of the PEP to be reactivated in the
planned time frames during surge/mobilization. Inoperable
(broken, out of calibration) IPE could delay PEP
reactivation.
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Conclusion 4: Similar inactive lathes under similar
conditions will have the same bearing flattening problem
caused by a lack of lubrication and operation as the
inactive Acme-Gridley lathes tested at Riverbank Army
Ammunition Plant.
The Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant tests on IPE
indicated that bearings in the Acme-Gridley lathes were
deteriorating from the lack of lubrication. This was caused
by extended periods of equipment inoperability. A statement
by the Engineering manager at Riverbank Army Ammunition
Plant indicated that similar inactive lathes under the ?ain'
conditions would have the same problems. The reactivation
of PEP-669 tended to support this hypothesis.
Conclusion 5: There is little information available
on the condition of inactive special tools, special test
equipment, and other plant equipment which are three of
the four components of a PEP.
Responsibility for ST, and STE, and OPE, is delegated
to the planned producer of the PEP. Although an
inventory is kept on these items, condition assessments
are not performed. Unless the PEP has been recently
assembled, connected to power and tested, the condition
of ST and STE is suspect. In the event of
surge/mobilization, inoperable (i.e. broken, out of
calibration) ST and STE could delay PEP reactivation if
repairs are not made to this equipment.
Conclusion 6: There are no condition assessments
performed on contractor-owned IPE or equipment in a PEP.
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Contractor-owned equipment validation/identification (in
PEPs) are the only inspection activity that government
assessment teams may perform. The actual condition of
contractor-owned equipment remains unknown unless one of the
following occurs: 1) the government is willing to pay the
contractor for privileged equipment information; 2)
equipment information is provided free to the government or;
3) the PEP is or has recently been operational. The first
and second options have not been viable for either the
government or the contractor for different reasons.
Consequently, unless PEPs are or have been recently
operational (option 3), the readiness condition of
contractor-owned equipment is questionable. The inability
of the government to determine the actual condition of
contractor-owned equipment is a potential source of
contractor negligence. Furthermore, in the event of
surge/mobilization, inoperable contractor equipment could
delay reactivation of PEPs.
Conclusion 7: There is a shrinking source of critical
labor skills for IPE which is more than 30 years old.
The majority of IFE owned by the Services' is over 30
years old. Today's machinists however, are trained on state
of the art equipment. Unless new machinists are trained to
operate old IPE, the skilled labor needed to operate old
equipment may not be available due to death, retirement, or
relocation. In the event of PEP reactivation during
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surge/mobilization, PEP contractors will be competing with
the military and with each other for a shrinking reserve of
manpower. PEP reactivation will be delayed if the skilled
labor to operate 30 year old IPE cannot be found.
Currently, there is no system in existence or planned which
tracks critical skills and specific people in the civilian
population. This manpower issue has not recently had a
thorough examination and is a worthy thesis topic in itself.
Conclusion 8: Parts support for the majority of IPE
over 30 years old is disappearing.
The lack of replacement parts for old IPE is due to the
fact that machine tool companies are phasing out support for
older nodels of IPE and some parts manufacturers are going
out of business. If new sources of replacement parts for
old IPE cannot be identified, PEP reactivation could be
delayed.
Conclusions 3 through 8 highlighted significant
potential problems with the operation of PEPs in the event
of reactivation during surge/mobilization. Until these
potential problems are solved, mobilization of inactive PEPs
may be very difficult. Furthermore, we found no solid
evidence to suggest that PEPs could be reactivated and in
production within the mobilization time requirements.
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B. RZCOmmNDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Conditionally assess all inactive
PEPs by connecting them to power and operating them.
Recommendation 2: Adjust mobilization plans to
incorporate any new information found in the condition
assessment of PEPs noted above (i.e. time delays in PEP
reactivation).
Recommendation 3: Repair or replace the ST, STE, OPE,
and IPE in PEPs as needed so that all PEPs will function.
Recommendation 4: Eliminate (disestablish) all inactive
PEPs.
C. SUIMARY
This thesis is a study of plant equipment packages which
are designed for use in times of national emergency. Our
research found that PEPs not connected to power and operated
(inactive) were not a viable resource for surge/mobilization
while PEPs connected to power and operated were. During
times when budgets are limited, maintaining PEPs that cannot
function in their intended manner (i.e., produce critically
needed war material when needed) is an unnecessary drain on
DOD funding. Inactive PEPa that cannot be reactivated and
in production within the mobilization time requirements
should be disestablished.
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APP NDIX A: PUPS
PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
0059 COCO BMY INC BAIR PA
0059 RECOVERY VEHICLE, FT, LT, M578
0059 HOWITZER, MED, SP, 155MM, M109A2
0059 HO1TITZER, HEAVY, SP, 8-, M11OA2
0065 COCO DYN AMERICA IN MUNCIE IN
0065 LINK CTG M13 7.62MM MB
0065 LINK M27 F/CTG 5.56MM
0069 COCO OLIN CORP EAST ALTON IL
0069 CTG CAL.50 BLANK Ml LKD X/M2/9
0069 CTG 5.56MM 4 BALL M855 1 TR M856 LKD (SAW)
0069 CTG 5.56MM BALL M193 1ORD CLIP
0069 CUP CTG CASE 5.56MM
0069 CUP JACKET GM 5.56MM BALL
0069 CUP CTG CASE 7.62MM
0069 CUP BULLET JACKET BM 7.62MM
0098 COCO NI IND-VERNON LOS ANGELES CA
0098 CASE CTG MK 9 3/50 ALL MODS
0098 CASE CTG MK 9 5/54 ALL MODS
0098 CASE CTG 76MM (STEEL)
0098 CASE CTG MK10-1.
0098 CASE CTG M115B1 105MM
0098 CASE CTG MI50BI 105MM
0098 CASE CTG BASE & SEAL (PN 12524833)
0098 CASE CTG M148AlBl 105MM
0098 SHELL SMK WP M416 105MM
0098 SHELL AP 155MM M731/M692 FASCAM
0098 SHELL HEP M123 165MM
0098 MOTOR BODY F/155MM PROJ M549 HE RAP
0098 SHELL, HE, M509A1 8 INCH MPTS
0098 WARHEAD AFT ASSY F/PROJ 8 INCH HE M650 RA
0098 SHELL ILLUM M485 155MM
0098 SHELL HE M483 155MM
0098 SHELL AT 155MM M718/M741 FASCAM
0098 MOTOR ROCKET BODY F/PROJ 8 INCH HE M650 RA
0098 PROJ SHIP ASSEMBLY 5/54 HI-FRAG (FWD/AFT)
0098 MOTOR ROCKET M54 66MM
0098 SHELL HE M549 W/O MOTOR BODY 155MM
0109 GOCO INDIANA AAP ICI CHARLESTOWN IN
0109 CHARGE BAG LOADING ASSY M36A1 F/4.2 IN
0109 CHARGE BAG LOADING ASSY M36A1 F/4.2 IN
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PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
0109 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M90Al
0109 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M185 F/81MM
0109 CHARGE PROP 105MM M67
0109 CHARGE PROP 10514M 67
0109 CHARGE PROP 105MM M67
0109 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M205 F/81MM
0109 CHARGE BAG LOADING ASSY M36A2 F/4.2 IN
0109 CHARGE BAG LOADING ASSY M36A2 F/4.2 IN
0109 CHARGE BAG LOADING ASSY M36A2 F/4.2 IN
0109 CHARGE PROP 8 IN Ml GB F/HOW M2,M2A1 +
0109 CHARGE PROP 8 IN Ml GB F/HOW M2,M2AI +
0109 CHARGE PROP 8 IN M2 WB F/HOW M2
0109 CHARGE PROP 8 IN M2 WB F/HOW M2
0109 REDUCER FLASH M3 F/8IN HOW. M2 M2AI &
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M3A1 GB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M3AI GB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M3AI GB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M4A2 WB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M4A2 WB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M4A2 WB F/HOW
0109 CHARGE PROP 8 IN WB M188A1
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M119A2
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM 119A2
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM 4119A2
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M203AI
0109 CHARGE PROP 155MM M203A1
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 SP
0109 PROPELLANT SB Ml SP
0109 COMPOSITION A-5
0109 BLACK POWDER POTASSIUM NITRATE
0109 PROPELLANT SB M6
0109 PROPELLANT SB 16
0109 PROPELLANT SB M6
0109 PROPELLANT SB M6
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0109 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0112 GOCO IOWA AAP-M&H MIDDLETOWN IA
0112 CTG 105MM HERA XM913
0112 PROJ 155MM HE M107 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0112 PROJ 155MM HE RAP M549 TNT LOADED
0112 PROJ 155MM HE M718 RAAM (FASCAM) W/O FZ
0112 PROJ 155MM HE M741 RAAM (FASCAM) W/O FZ
0112 PROJ 8 IN HE RAP M650
0112 GRENADE HAND OFFENSIVE MK 3a2 W/F M206A2
0112 WARHEAD HAWK MISSILE LDD
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PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
0112 WARHEAD CHAPARRAL M250
0112 WARHEAD HELFIRE MISSILE SYSTEM
0112 WARHEAD HE M225 LAP (DRAGON)
0112 WARHEAD PATRIOT M248
0112 WARHEAD STINGER M258 (W/HTA-3)
0112 WARHEAD SECTION LAP W/O FZ F/155M PROJ M712
0112 WARHEAD SEC HE M207E5 LAP F/TOW-2A
0112 FUZE MINE M603 W/BOOSTER M120
0112 FUZE MINE M605 (T1203)
0112 MINE AP M74 F/GEMSS DWG 9292600 F/M128 SYSTEM
0112 MINE AT M75 F/GEMSS DWG 9292600 F/M128 SYSTEM
0112 MINE AT M75 F/GEMSS DWG 9292600 F/M128 SYSTEM
0112 DISPENSER & BOMB AIRCRAFT CBU/78 (NAVY SUU-58/B)
0112 MINE CANISTER XM87 W/MINES BLU-91&92B (VOLCANO)
0112 DEMOLITION KIT CRATERING M180
0112 DETONATOR M17
0112 DETONATOR PERC M2AI 8 SEC DELAY
0112 DETONATOR PERC M1A2
0112 CHARGE DEMO BLOCK TNT 1/4 LB





0113 GOCO JOLIET AAP-U/ROYAL JOLIET IL
0113 CTG 105MM HE Ml WSC W/O/F TNT LOADED



























0114 GOCO KANSAS AAP-D&Z PARSONS KS
0114 CTG 105MM HE HI WSC W/O/F TNT LOADED
0114 CTG 81MN HE M374A3 W/F M567
0114 PROJ 155MM HE DP (ICM) M483A1
0114 CHARGE EXPULSION F/155MM M483A1.
0114 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 8833562
0114 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-87/B GEM
0114 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-87/B GEM
0114 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0114 GRENADE GP M77 (HE-TACTICAL) F/MLRS





0114 SPECIAL PURPOSE LEAD AZIDE
0114 PRIMER PERC M55
0114 PRIMER PERC M1B1A2
0114 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 8876218
0116 GOCO LAKE CITY AAP-OLIN INDEPENDENCE MO
0116 CUP BULLET JACKET GMCS BALL 7.62MM
0116 DETONATOR M57 (T92E1)
0116 CTG CAL. 50 4 BALL M33 1 TR M17 W/M9 LINK
0116 CTG CAL. 50 LKD 4 API M8 1 API-T M20 W/M9 BELT
0116 CTG 7.62MM SPECIAL BALL M118 CARTON
0116 CTG 20MM HEI M56A3 TP-T M220 LKD 4-1 F/COBRA
0116 CTG 20MM HEI M56A3 TP-T M220 ELEC 7-1 W/M14 LK
0116 CTG 20MM TP LKD 4 TP M55A2 1 TPT M220 W/M14A2
0116 CTG 7.62MM BALL M39 F/AK 47
0116 CTG 20MM TP M55 MLB MK 7 MOD 0
0116 CTG 5.56MM BLANK M200 CARTON
0116 CTG CAL. 50 LKD 4 API M8 1 API-T M20 W/BELT M15A2
0116 CTG 7.62MM BLANK M82 W/M13 LINK PRACTICE
0116 CTG CAL. 50 LKD 4 BALL M33 1 TR M17 W/M15A2 LK
0116 CTG 7.62MM 4BALL,M80-1TRM62 F/OHF
0116 CTG 7.62MM LKD 4BALL M80-1 TR M62 W/M13 LINK
0116 CTG 7.62MM BALL M80 W/M13 LINK
0116 CTG 7.62MM TRACER M62 W/M13 LINK
0116 CTG 7.62MM BALL M80 5RD CLIP
0116 CTG 5.56MM TRACER M196 IN CTN F/M16 RIFLE
0116 CTG 5.56MM TRACER M196 1ORD CLIP
0116 CTG 7.62MM LKD 4BALL H80-1 TR M62 (F/MG GAU2B/A
0116 CTG 7.62MM TRACER M62 CARTON
0116 CTG CAL. 50 4-API MS 1-TR M17 W/M15 LINK
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0116 CTG 5.56MM 4 BALL M193 1 TR M196 F/STONER MG
0116 CTG 20MM HEI M56A3 ELEC W/M14 LINK
0116 CTG 7.62MM BALL M80 8RD CLIP
0116 CTG 20124 HEI M56A3 W/M22 LINK
0116 CASE CTG M103 20MM
0116 FUZE PD M505A3 DWG 7258863
0116 FUZE PD M505A3
0116 CTG 25MM HEI-T M792 W/F M758 PDSD W/M28 LINK
0116 CTG 30M 5-API PGU-14A/B 1-HEI PGU-13A/B GAU-8
0116 CTG 20M HEI M56A3 W/FUZE M505A3 LINKLESS
0116 CTG 20MM TP M55A2 BULK
0116 CTG 20M TPT M220 BULK
0116 CTG 5.56MM TRACER (SAW) M856
0116 CTG 5.56MM BALL (SAW) M855
0116 CTG 5.56MM 4 BALL M855 1 TR M856 LKD (SAW)
0116 CTG 20MM DUMMY M51AIE1 W/MK 7 LNK
0116 CTG 5.56MM BALL M193 lORD CLIP
0116 CTG 5.56MM GRENADE M195 CARTON
0116 PRIMER PERC M36A1
0116 PRIMER ELEC M52A3B1
0116 PRIMER PERC Ml15
0116 CUP CTG CASE 5.56MM
0116 CUP BULLET JACKET GM 7.62MM1
0117 GOCO LONE STAR AAP-D&Z TEXARKANA TX
0117 RELAY M4
0117 CHARGE BURSTER M19
0117 CHARGE BURSTER F/XM722 60MM
0117 CTG 4.2 IN HE M329A2 W/O/F COMP-B LOADED
0117 TRACER M13
0117 CHARGE BURSTER M53
0117 INITIATOR BURSTER M13 (T7)
0117 CHARGE BURSTER M35
0117 TRACER M5A1B1
0117 CHARGE BURSTER M47
0117 TRACER M12
0117 PROJ 155MM HE DP (ICM) M483A1
0117 CHG SPOTTING PROJ (155MM/8IN)
0117 CHARGE BURSTER M54AI
0117 PROJ 155MM HE M107 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0117 CHARGE SUPPLEMENTARY
0117 DELAY DETONATOR F/155MM M692/M731
0117 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 9298456
0117 DELAY ASSY F/M549 PART NO 9235983
0117 PROJ 8 IN HE M509AI W/O/FZ
0117 PROJ 16/50 HE-ICM MK146-1
0117 DELAY ELEMENT FUZE BOMB M9 NON-DELAY
0117 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 8833562
0117 DETONATOR MK 25 MOD 1
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0117 GRENADE HAND FRAG M67 W/F M213
0117 GRENADE HAND FRAG M67 W/F M213
0117 GRENADE GP M77 (HE-TACTICAL) F/MLRS
0117 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 9215330
0117 MOTOR ROCKET M54 F/66MM
0117 FUZE ROCKET M427
0117 CHARGE BURSTER F/2.75 IN RKT
0117 PRIMER IGN MINE FZ F/M10A2
0117 LEAD ASSY DWG 9287609
0117 DISPENSER & BOMB AIRCRAFT CBU/78 (NAVY SUU-58/B)
0117 MINE CANISTER XM87 W/MINES BLU-91&92B (VOLCANO)
0117 DETONATOR MK 50 MOD 0
0117 DETONATOR M62
0117 DETONATOR M49
0117 DETONATOR ASSY DWG 8796342
0117 DETONATOR STAB M98
0117 DELAY ELEMENT M 53




0117 PRIMER PERC M 125 MOD 1
0117 DETONATOR MK 23-1
0117 DETONATOR M36A1
0117 DETONATOR MK 44 MOD 1




0117 DETONATOR MK 29 MOD 0
0117 COMPOSITION A-5
0117 DETONATOR ELEC M48 (T1SE4)
0117 DETONATOR M58




0117 DETONATOR STAB M94
0117 DETONATOR STAB M50 (T36)
0117 DETONATOR M46
0117 DETONATOR STAB M59
0117 PRIMER PERC MK 102 MOD 1
0117 RELAY XM9
0117 DETONATOR MK 71
0117 PRIMER PERC MK 157 MOD 0
0117 PRIMER MK 22
0117 DELAY PLUNGER Ml
0117 FUZE PD M567
0117 PRIMER ELEC M86
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0117 RELAY M7
0117 FUZE BD M534A1
0117 FUZE PI-BD M509A2
0117 PRIMER ELEC M8OA1
0117 PRIMER PERC XM90El
0117 BOOSTER AUXILIARY M122
0117 FUZE PD M521 (T247)
0117 PRIMER PERC/ELEC MK 15-2 LOADING
0117 PRIMER PERC M82
0117 PRIMER PERC M28B2
0117 PRIMER PERC M82
0117 FUZE PD M557
0117 PRIMER ELEC M83E3
0117 PRIMER PERC MK 2A4
0117 PRIMER STAB M96
0117 FUZE PROX M732
0117 PRIMER PERC M61
0117 RELAY MII
0117 PRIMER STAB M26
0117 PRIMER M104
0117 PRIMER ELEC M120
0117 DELAY M2
0117 PRIMER PERC MK 104 MOD 0
0117 DELAY DET F/FUZE M536
0119 GOCO LOUISIANA AAP-THIOK SHREVEPORT LA
0119 CTG 4.2 IN HE M329A2 W/O/F COMP-B LOADED
0119 PROJ 155MM HE M731 ADAM (FASCAM) W/O FZ
0119 PROJ 155MM HE M107 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0119 PROJ 155MM HE M107 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0119 CHARGE SUPPLEMENTARY
0119 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0119 SHELL ILLUM M485 1551
0119 SHELL HE M483 155MM
0119 SHELL HE M483 155MM
0119 SHELL SMK 155MM M825 BE
0119 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0119 GRENADE M73 LDD F/M261 HYDRA 70 ROCKET MPSM
0119 PROJ 155MM HE M692 ADAM (FASCAM) W/O FZ
0119 FUZE ROCKET M433
0119 FUZE ROCKET M423
0119 ROCKET 2.75 IN HE M151 W/FZ M433 (HYDRA 70)
0119 RKT 2.75IN HYDRA 70 HE M151 W/F M423 MK66 MTR
0119 MINE NON-BOUNDING AP M18A1 CLAYMORE W/ACCESORIES
0119 MINE AT HEAVY HE M21 METALLIC
0119 MINE AT M24 El W/F M404A2
0119 CHARGE DEMO BLOCK M112 1.25LB COMP C-4
0119 CHARGE ASSY DEMO M183
0119 CHARGE LINEAR HE (C4) M59
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0119 CHARGE DEMO FLEX LINEAR M58A3
0119 COMPOSITION C-4
0120 GOCO MILAN AAP-MART MARI MILAN TN
0120 CTG 60MM HE M49A4 W/F M525
0120 CTG 40MM AP M576 (BULK) F/GREN LAUNCHER M79
0120 CTG 40MM PRAC M407A1 W/F M551
0120 CTG 40MM HE DP M433 W/F PIBD M550
0120 CTG 60MM HE M720 W/F M734 (LWCMS)
0120 IGNITION CTG 60MM M702E3
0120 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M204 F/60MM
0120 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M204 F/60MM
0120 CTG 60MM HE M888 W/F M935
0120 CTG 40M PRAC M385 W/LK M16A1 F/LAUNCHER M75
0120 CTG 40MM TP M918 F/MK 19 MG
0120 CTG 4.2 IN HE M329A2 W/O/F COMP-B LOADED
0120 CTG 105MM4 M456A2 HEAT-T W/F M509A2
0120 CTG 105MM M735 APFSDS-T W/O/F
0120 CTG 105MM TPDS-T M724AI F/GUN M68 W/O/F
0120 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M205 F/81MM
0120 CHARGE INCREMENT ASSY M205 F/81MM
0120 IGNITION CTG 81MM M299
0120 CTG 105M M774 (DU) APFSDS-T W/O/F
0120 CTG 105M TP-T M490Al F/GUN M68 (TNG ONLY)
0120 CTG 105MM M833 (DU) APFSDS-T
0120 CTG 81M HE M821 (UK-I-81) W/F MO M734
0120 CTG 81M HE M889 W/F PD M935 (UKI81)
0120 CHARGE PROP M219 F/81MH
0120 CHARGE PROP M219 F/81MM
0120 CHARGE PROP M218 F/81MM
0120 CHARGE PROP M218 F/81MM
0120 IGNITER M752 F/81MM
0120 PROJ 155MM HE DP (ICM) M483A1
0120 PROJ 155MM HE DP (ICM) M483A1
0120 CASE CTG 40MM4 M118 DWG 8844609
0120 PROJ 155MM HE XM864 DPICM
0120 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 9215330
0120 CHARGE LINEAR HE (C4) M59
0122 GOCO RAVENNA AAP-RAVENNA RAVENNA OH
0122 PROJ 155MM M107 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0122 PROJ 8 IN HE M106 W/O/F WSC TNT LOADED
0122 PROJ 155MM HE RAP M549 TNT LOADED
0122 DETONATOR MK 50 MOD 0
0122 DETONATOR MK 23-1
0122 DETONATOR M55
0122 DETONATOR MK 71
0122 FUZE PD M739A1
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0125 GOCO TCAAP-FED CTG NEW BRIGHTON MN
0125 CTG 7.62MM LKD 4BALL M80-1 TR M62 W/M13 LINK
0125 CTG 7.62MM LKD 4BALL M80-1 TR M62 F/MG GAU2B/A
0125 CTG 5.56MM BALL M193 lORD CLIP
0149 GOGO PINE BLUFF ARSENAL PINE BLUFF AR
0149 CTG 81MM SMK WP M375A2 W/F M567
0149 CTG 81MM SMK WP M375A3 W/F M567
0149 CTG 81MM SMK WP M375A3 W/F M567
0149 CTG 4.2 IN SMK WP M328A1 W/F M521
0149 CTG 105MM SMK HC-BE M84 SERIES W/F M577A1
0149 CTG 105MM TP-T M490A1 F/GUN M68 (TNG ONLY)
0149 CTG 81MM SMK SCREENING RP M819 W/FZ M84AIE1
0149 PROJ 155MM SMOKE WP MI10A2 W/O/F
0149 CANISTER SMK WP MK 14 F/5 IN 54 CAL PR
0149 CANISTER SMK WP MS F/5 IN 38 CAL PROJ
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK YELLOW BE M116 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 155M SMK GREEN BE M116 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK RED BE M116 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK HC BE M116A1 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK WP M825 W/O FZ
0149 GRENADE HAND SMK NC ABC AN-M8 W/F M201A1.
0149 GRENADE HAND INC TH3 AN-M14 W/F M201AI.
0149 GRENADE HAND VIOLET SMK M18 W/F M201A1.
0149 GRENADE HAND YELLOW SMK M18 W/FZ M201A1.
0149 GRENADE HAND RC CS M47E3 W/F M227.
0149 GRENADE HAND RED SMK RIOT SIN M48E3 W/F M227
0149 GRENADE HAND RIOT CS1 ABC-M25A2 (COMPLETE)
0149 GRENADE HAND/RIFLE SMK WP M34 W/F M206A2.
0149 GRENADE HAND RIOT CS ABC-M7A3 W/FZ M201AI
0149 GRENADE SMK SCRN RP UKL8A3 F/M250 LAUNCHER
0149 ROCKET 66MM INCEND TPA 4RD CLIP M74
0149 WARHEAD RKT 2.75IN SMK WP M156 W/FZ PD M427
0149 ROCKET 2.75 IN SMK WP N259
0149 SMK POT FLOATING SGF2 M7A1 W/F M208
0149 SMK POT GRND MK 6 MOD 1
0149 SMK POT GRND HC MS 10-20 MIN BURN
0149 CTG 81MM SMK WP M375A2 W/F M567
0149 CTG 81M SMK WP M375A3 W/F M567
0149 CTG 81MM SMK WP M375A3 W/F M567
0149 CTG 4.2 IN SMK WP M328A1 W/F M521
0149 CTG 105MM SMK HC-BE M84 SERIES W/F M577A1
0149 CTG 105MM TP-T M490A1 F/GUN M68 (TNG ONLY)
0149 CTG 81MM SMK SCREENING RP M819 W/FZ M84AIE1
0149 PROJ 155MM SMOKE WP M110A2 W/O/F
0149 CANISTER SMK WP MK 14 F/5 IN 54 CAL PR
0149 CANISTER SMK WP MS F/5 IN 38 CAL PROJ
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK YELLOW BE M116 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 15SMM SMK RED BE M116 W/O/F
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0149 PROJ 155MM SMK HC BE M116A1 W/O/F
0149 PROJ 155MM SMK NP M825 W/O FZ
0149 GRENADE HAND SMK HC ABC AN-M8 W/F M201AI.
0149 GRENADE HAND INC TH3 AN-M14 W/F M201AI.
0149 GRENADE HAND VIOLET SMK M18 W/F M201AI.
0149 GRENADE HAND YELLOW SMK M18 W/FZ M201AI.
0149 GRENADE HAND RC CS M47E3 W/F M227.
0149 GRENADE HAND RED SMK RIOT SIN M48E3 W/F M227
0149 GRENADE HAND RIOT CS1 ABC-M25A2 (COMPLETE)
0149 GRENADE HAND/RIFLE SMK WP M34 W/F M206A2.
0149 GRENADE HAND RIOT CS ABC-M7A3 W/FZ M201AI
0149 GRENADE SMK SCRN RP UKL8A3 F/M250 LAUNCHER
0149 ROCKET 66MM INCEND TPA 4RD CLIP M74
0149 WARHEAD RKT 2.75IN SMK WP M156 W/FZ PD M427
0149 ROCKET 2.75 IN SMK WP M259
0149 SMK POT FLOATING SGF2 M7A1 W/F M208
0149 SMK POT GRND ME 6 MOD 1
0149 SM POT GRND HC MS 10-20 MIN BURN
0149 SM POT FLOATING HC M4A2
0149 MASK,CBR,PROTECTIVE TANK, M25A1
0158 COCO COVERT MFG CO GALION OH
0158 SHELL HE M329A2 4.2 IN (FORGED)
0209 GOCO SCRANTON AAP-CHAMB SCRANTON PA
0209 SHELL SMOKE M110 155MM
0209 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0209 SHELL, HE, M509AI 8 INCH MPTS
0211 COCO ANDERSON MTLS INDS CONCORD ONT CN
0211 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0219 COCO ASTRA PREC PROD ELK GROVE VLG IL
0219 CTG 20MM APDS MW149 (CIWS) PHALANX
0219 SHELL ILLUM M314A3 105MM
0219 FUZE M223 PROCURED LOADED
0219 FUZE PD M 352 MOD 2
0224 GOCO RIVERBANK AAP-NORRI RIVERBANK CA
0224 SHELL HE F/M720 60MM[
0224 SHELL HE M49A3 60MM
0224 SHELL SMK M302A1 60MM
0224 SHELL SMK BODY ASY MPTS
0224 CASE CTG 105MM M14B4 (M14 SERIES)
0224 SHELL HE M374A1 F/81MM MORTAR
0224 SHELL SMK M375A1 81MM
0224 SHELL HE M329A2 4.2 IN (FORGED)
0224 SHELL HE F/M821 81M (UK-I)
0224 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
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0224 GRENADE MPTS F/M77 GRENADE (MLRS)
0227 COCO TEMTEX PRODUCTS INC NASHVILLE TN
0227 BOMBLET BLU 73A/B
0227 FIN ASSEMBLY BOMB BSU-86 F/MK82 SERIES
0230 COCO REEDER & KLINE MACH CARMEL IN
0230 SHELL HE M483 155MM
0234 COCO NATIONAL FORGE IRVINE PA
0234 TUBE, 105MM, M68AI
0234 BREECH MECHANISM ASSEMBLY, 105MM, M68
0234 CANNON, 105MM, M68
0242 COCO REMCO HYD ABEX CORP WILLITS CA
0242 TUBE, 155MM, M185
0242 CANNON, 155MM, M185 (WO/GFM)
0242 CANNON, 155MM, M185 (W/GFM)
0253 GOCO BADGER AAP-OLIN COR BARABOO WI
0253 PROPELLING ASSY M36A2 LESS CHARGE BAG F/4.2 IN
0253 ROCKET GRAIN MK 82 F/RAP 5/38
0253 CHARGE PROP 155MM M119A2
0253 PROP GRAIN FWD EXTRUDED F/155MM HE RAP M549
0253 PROP GRAIN AFT EXTRUDED F/155M HE RAP M549
0253 CHARGE PROP 155MM M203AI
0253 PROPELLANT N-34 F/RAP 5/38 5/54 GUN AMMO
0253 PROP MORTAR INCREMENT M8
0253 PROPELLANT WC 895/HPC/CR F/GAU-8
0253 PROPELLANT SPHEROIDAL PROP IGNITER (SPI)
0253 PROPELLANT SPHEROIDAL PROP IGNITER (SPI)
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 846
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 846
0253 PROPELLANT SB M6
0253 PROPELLANT SB M6
0253 PROPELLANT SB M6
0253 PROPELLANT SB M6
0253 PROPELLANT SB M6
0253 PROPELLANT WC 860
0253 PROPELLANT WC 860
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 844
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 844
0253 PROPELLANT SB NACO NAVY
0253 PBX 0-280
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 872
0253 PROPELLANT DB WC 872
0253 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS M37
0253 PROPELLANT SLOTTED STICK M31AIEI.080 WEB
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0254 HMX BULK (NOT USED IN COMPOSITIONS)
0254 COMPOSITION A-4
0254 PBX 0-280
0254 RDX BULK (NOT USED IN COMPOSITIONS)




0257 GOCO LONGHORN AAP-THIOK MARSHALL TX
0257 CTG 60MM ILLUM M83A3 W/F V49A1
0257 CTG 40MM GREEN STAR PARA . 61 (BULK)
0257 CTG 40MM RED STAR PARA M662
0257 CTG 60M0 ILLUM M721 (LWCMS) W/F M766 (OFF-SHORE)
0257 CTG 811 M301A3 ILLUM W/F M84AI
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING F/105M M84 BE
0257 CTG 105MM ILLUM M314A3 W/F M577A1
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING F/1054M 1314 ILL
0257 CTG 4.2 IN ILLUM M335A2 W/F M577A1
0257 CTG 4.2 IN ILLUM M335A2 W/F M577A1
0257 CTG 8114 ILLUM M853
0257 PROJ 1554 ILLUM M485A2 W/O/F F/HOW
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING SECONDARY F/M485 ILL
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING PRIMARY F/M485 ILL
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING F/155MMM116 BE
0257 CHARGE EXPELLING F/155M M825 WP SMK
0257 BURSTER INCENDIARY FIELD M4
0257 SIGNAL SMK GRD M128Al GREEN PARACHUTE
0257 SIGNAL SMK GRD M129A1 RED PARACHUTE
0257 FLARE AN/ALA 17/A
0257 SIGNAL ILLUM GRD M125A1 GREEN STAR
0257 SIGNAL ILLUM GRD M126A1 RED STAR
0257 FLARE SURFACE TRIP PARA M49A1
0257 SIGNAL ILLUM GRD M127AI WHITE STAR
0257 SIGNAL ILLUM GRD M159 WS CLUSTER
0257 SIGNAL ILLUM GRD M158 CLUSTER RED STAR
0257 SIGNAL SMOKE AND ILLUMINATION MK 124 MOD 0
0257 FLARE IR COUNTER MEASURE MJU-7/B
0257 FLARE AIRCRAFT IR COUNTERMEASURE M206
0257 FLARE INFRA CNTR MSR RR-119-B/AL
0257 FLARE IR ACFT MJU-SA/B (NAVY)
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0257 PBX N-5
0257 FUZE TIME (VT) M84AI
0257 FUZE TIME M65AI
0260 GOCO RADFORD AAP-HERCUL RADFORD VA
0260 CHARGE INCREMENT 60MM M182
0260 CHARGE INCREMENT 60MM M181
0260 PROPELLING ASSY M36A1 LESS CHARGE BAG F/4.2 IN
0260 PROPELLING ASSY M36A2 LESS CHARGE BAG F/4.2 IN
0260 PROPELLANT GRAIN F/8 IN HE RA M650
0260 PROP GRAIN FWD EXTRUDED F/155MM HE RAP M549
0260 PROP GRAIN AFT EXTRUDED F/155MM HE RAP M549
0260 MOTOR LAUNCHER M114 (P/N 9225166)
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENT ROCKET M7 (MODIFIED)
0260 CHARGE PROP ASSY F/66MM ROCKET
0260 CHARGE PROP ASSY M7 F/35MM RKT PRAC M73
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENT ROCKET M7
0260 MOTOR RKT ASSY F/M180 DEMO CRATE RING CHG
0260 ROCKET GRAIN MK 90
0260 CASTING PDR F/DB CAST AHH
0260 PROP MORTAR INCREMENT MS
0260 PROPELLANT SB AS1052 NAVY 20M




0260 PROPELLANT SB IMR 5010
0260 PROPELLANT SB IMR 4895
0260 POWDER CLEAN BURNING IGNITION (CBI)
0260 PROPELLANT SB M6
0260 PROPELLANT SB M6
0260 PROPELLANT SB Ml MP
0260 PROPELLANT SB M1 MP
0260 PROPELLANT DB NOSlH AA2
0260 SHEET PROPELLANT (MIS-18654)
0260 STICK PROPELLANT (MIS-18629)
0260 PROPELLANT SB M6+2
0260 PROPELLANT SB NACO NAVY
0260 PROPELLANT PYRO M6 SB
0260 PROPELLANT SB M10
0260 PROPELLANT TRIPLE BASE M31A1
0260 GRAIN IGNITER F/FLIGHT MTR M114 F/TOW-2
0260 PROPELLANT TB M30
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS M37
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS JA-2 F/120MM
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS STK DIGL-RP 14" F/120MM
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS STICK DIGL-RP 4" F/120MM
0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS DIGL-RP FLK F/120MM
0260 PROPELLANT SB LKL F/120MM TANK
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0260 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS SUPPORT PROFILER
0260 PROPELLANT SB M14
0260 PROPELLANT SLOTTED STICK M31A1E1.080 WEB
0260 DINITROTOLUENE (DNT)
0261 GOCO SUNFLOWER AAP-HERC DESOTO KS
0261 CHARGE PROP 8 IN WB M188A1
0261 PROP GRAIN FWD EXTRUDED F/155MM HE RAP M549
0261 PROP GRAIN AFT EXTRUDED F/155MM HE RAP M549
0261 CHARGE PROP 155MM M203AI
3261 ROCKET GRAIN MK 49 & MODS
0261 MOTOR RKT ASSY F/M180 DEMO CRATE RING CHG
0261 ROCKET GRAIN MK 43




0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS ROCKET N5
0261 PBX 0-280
0261 PROPELLANT TRIPLE BASE M31AI
0261 PROPELLANT NOSIH-AA-6
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS M37
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS JA-2 F/120MM
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS STK DIGL-RP 14" 120MM
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS STICK DIGL-RP 4" F/120MM
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS DIGL-RP FLK F/120MM
0261 PROPELLANT SOLVENTLESS SUPPORT PROFILER
0261 PROPELLANT SLOTTED STICK M31A1E1.080 WEB
0261 PROPELLANT SLOTTED STICK M31AIEI.080 WEB











0263 GOCO NEWPORT AAP-UNIROYL NEWPORT IN
0263 COMPOSITION C-4






PEP# TYE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
0263 TRINITROTOLUENE (TNT)
0399 COCO HAMILTON TECHNOLOGY LANCASTER PA
0399 FUZE MT MK 339 MOD 1
0399 FUZE BOMB MK 1 MOD 0
0399 FUZE PD M739
0399 FUZE MTSQ M577
0399 FUZE MT M571E3 PROCURED LOADED
0399 FUZE MTSQ M577A1/M582A1 MPTS (PROCURED LOADED)
0420 COCO MERRITT TOOL CO KILGORE TX
0420 SHELL HE M107 155M4
0420 MOTOR BODY F/155MM PROJ M549 HE RAP
0422 COCO CHAMBERLAIN MFG COR NEW BEDFORD MA
0422 SHELL HEAT&T M456A1 105MM
0422 SHELL SMOKE MI0 1554
0422 PROJ BODY MK 61 F/5/54
0422 PROJ BODY MK 64 F/5/54
0422 SHELL AP 155MM M731/M692 FASCAM
0422 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0422 SHELL ILLUM M485 155MM
0422 SHELL HE M483 155MM
0422 SHELL AT 155MM M718/M741 FASCAM
0428 COCO PITTSBURGH FORGINGS CORAOPOLIS PA
0428 SHELL HE Ml 105MM
0428 MOTOR BODY F/1554 PROJ M549 HE RAP
0437 COCO POHLMAN (VALENTEC) MARYLAND HTS MO
0437 FUZZ PD M505A3
0437 SHELL 20MM HEI M56A3/4/5
0437 SHELL HE DP M430 40MM
0443 COCO IRI INTERNATIONAL PAMPA TX
0443 FORGING, TUBE, 105MM, M2A2
0443 FORGING, TUBE, 105MM, M137A1
0443 FORGING, TUBE, 155MM, M185
0443 FORGING, TUBE, 8", M201
0444 COCO IRI INTERNATIONAL PAMPA TX
0444 TUBE, 105MM, M2A2
0444 CANNON, 105MM, M2A2
0444 CANNON, 105MM, M137A1
0444 TUBE, 105MM, M137A1
0455 COCO CHAMBERLAIN MFG COR WATERLOO IA
0455 PROJECTILE MPTS ASSY F/M830
0455 SHELL HE M329A2 4.2 IN (FORGED)
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0455 SHELL SMK WP M60 105MM
0455 SHELL ILLUM M314A3 1051M4
0455 SHELL BE M84EI 105MM
0455 SHELL ILLUM M335A2 4.2 IN
0455 PROJ M833
0455 WARHEAD XM912 F/XM913 105MM
0459 COCO NATL DEFENSE CORP EAU CLAIRE WI
0459 SHELL HE Ml 105MM
0459 SHELL APERS XM603E1 105MM
0459 SHELL HE M106 8 IN
0463 COCO ALINABAL MILFORD CT
0463 GRENADE MPTS F/M42/M46
0463 CUP CTG CASE 5.56MM
0465 COCO WELLS (VALENTEC) COSTA MESA CA
0465 LINK CTG MK 7 20MM
0465 LINK CTG M9 CAL. 50 MB
0465 LINK BELT & END MK2 ALL MODS 20MM
0465 LINK CTG M13 7.62MM MB
0465 LINK METAL BELT M14A2 F/20MM
0465 FUZE PD M505A3
0465 SHOT 20MM TP M55A2
0465 SHELL 20MM HEIT-SD M246
0465 SHELL 20MM HEI M56A3/4/5
0465 SHELL 20MM TPT M221
0465 LINK CTG M22 F/20MM
0465 LINK M27 F/CTG 5.56MM
0465 LINK CTG M15A2 CAL. 50 MB
0472 GOGO WATERVLIET ARSENAL WATERVLIET NY
0472 BASE PLATE, MORTAR, MS F/60MM M19
0472 MORTAR, INFANTRY, 60MM, W/E, M19
0472 CANNON, 60MM, M2/M19
0472 MORTAR, 60MM,W/E, M224 (LWCMS)
0472 BASE PLATE, MORTAR, M8 F/60MM M224
0472 BASE PLATE, MORTAR, M7 F/60MM M224
0472 CANNON160MM1 M225 F/M224 MORTAR
0472 CANNON, 120MM, M256
0472 BASE PLATE, MORTAR, M3
0472 CANNON, 81MM, M29A1
0472 TUBE, 105MM, M2A2
0472 CANNON, 105MM1 M2A2
0472 MORTAR, 4.2", W/E1 M30
0472 CANNON, 4.2", M30
0472 CANNON, 105MM, M137AI
0472 TUBE, 105M, M137A1
0472 MORTAR, INFANTRY, 81MM 1W/E M29AI (W/M23AI MT)
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0472 TUBE, 105MM, M68A1
0472 BREECH MECHANISM ASSEMBLY, 105MM, M68
0472 CANNON, 105MM, M68
0472 MORTAR, 81MM, M252
0472 BREECH MECHANISM ASSEMBLY, 120MM, M256
0472 TUBE, FINISH MACHINED, 120MM
0472 CANNON, 81MM, M253
0472 CANNON, 105MM F/M119 HOWITZER
0472 TUBE, 105MM F/M119 HOWITZER
0472 CANNON, 155MM, M199 (GFM)
0472 TUBE, 155MM, M185
0472 CANNON, 155MM, M185 (WO/GFM)
0472 CANNON, 8", M201A1 W/O MUZZLE BRAKE
0472 CANNON, 155MM, MIA2
0472 MUZZLE BRAKE, 155MM, M198 HOW
0472 TUBE, 155MM, M199
0472 BREECH MECHANISM ASSEMBLY, 155MM, M199
0472 CANNON, 8", M2O1A1
0472 LINER, 8" MK16
0472 BARREL, GUN, MOD MK16
0472 RELINING, GUN BARREL 16"
0472 CANNON, 155MM, M185 (W/GFM)
0489 COCO ACTION MFG COOPLT 6 PHILADELPHIA PA
0489 BURSTER1 CANNISTER F/155M M825
0489 FUZE BOMB NOSE MECH M904 SERIES
0489 FUZE BOMB M904E4 NOSE IMPACT
0489 FUZE HAND GRENADE M227
0489 FUZE GRENADE M227
0489 FUZE ROCKET M412E1
0489 S&A ASSY DWG 9278015 F/M70/M73 MINE
0489 FUZE AUX DET MK 384 MOD 0
0489 FUZE TIME M65AI
0489 FUZE AUY DET MK 379-1.
0489 FUZE TIME (VT) M84A1
0489 FUZE PD MK 407 MOD 1
0489 DELAY PLUNGER Ml
0489 FUZE PD M567
0489 FUZE PI BD M509A2
0489 FUZE BD M62A2
0489 FUZE PD M935 & XM936 MPTS
0515 COCO CHAMBERLAIN MGF COR NEW BIGHTON MN
0515 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0561 COCO SACO DEFENSE INC SACO ME
0561 MACHINE GUN, CAL 50, FLEX M2 W/E SP BBL
0561 BARREL EXTENSION
0561 MACHINE GUN, 7.62MM, W/E, M60 W/SP BBL
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0561 MACHINE GUN, 7.62*, M60D W/SP BBL
0561 MACHINE GUN, CAL 50, FIXED, M2 W/SP BBL
0561 MACHINE GUN, 7.62MM, M60E3
0561 MACHINE GUN, 40*1, MK19
0574 COCO PEERLESS OF AMERICA CHICAGO IL
0574 SHELL HE M374AI F/814 MORTAR
0581 COCO MODERN MACH WORKS CUDAHY WI
0581 SHELL SMK WP M328 4.2 IN
0581 SHELL HE M329A2 4.2 IN (FORGED)
0600 COCO HONEYWELL INC-TCAAP NEW BRIGHTON MN
0600 DISPENSER MK 7 MOD 3
0600 CTG 30MM HEDP M789
0600 CTG 30MM TP M788
0600 CTG 25MM APDS-T M791 W/M28 LINK
0600 CTG 25MM TP-T M793 W/M28 LINK
0600 CTG 30MM TP PGU-15/B (GAU-8)
0600 CTG 25MM HEI-T M792 W/F M758 PDSD W/M28 LINK
0600 CTG 30MM HEI (GAU-8) PGU-13/B
0600 CTG 30MM 5-API PGU-14A/B 1-HEI PGU-13A/B GAU-8
0600 CTG 25M DUMMY PGU-24/U
0600 CTG 25MM TP PGU-23/U W/O TR
0600 CTG 25MM API PGU-20 W/O LINK (NAVY)
0600 CTG 25MM HEI PGU-22 W/O LINK (NAVY)
0600 CTG 25MM HEI PGU-25
0600 SHOT API 30MM (GAU-8)
0600 CTG 25MM HEIT MK210 MOD 2
0600 CTG 25MM TPDS-T M910
0600 FUZZ PDSD M761D F/40MM DIVADS
0600 MINE M67/M72 (HOUSE/TIMER) F/155MM M692/M731
0600 FUZZ FMU-95/B
0600 BOMBLET MK118 SERIES F/DISP MK7 MODS 3/6
0600 FUZE BOMB MK 1 MOD 0
0600 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-87/B CEM
0600 MINE AT MPTS (DWG 9281613) F/M56 SUBSYSTEM
0600 LENS ASSY ELEC F/M70/M73 MINE.
0600 LENS ASSY F/M75 AT MINE F/GEMSS (FASCAM)
0600 TRIP LINE SENSOR F/M74 AP MINE AND BLU-92/B
0600 LENS ASSY F/BLU-91/B AT MINE F/GATOR (FASCAM)
0600 FUZE PD M550
0600 FUZZ PD M758 PDSD F/CTG 25MM (BUSHMASTER)
0600 BATTERY SINGLE CELL PRIMARY (FASCAM) P/N9275567
0602 COCO FLINCHBAUGH PRODUCT RED LION PA
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0602 MOTOR BODY F/XM913 105MM HERA CTG
0602 CASE CTG BASE & SEAL (PN 12524833)
0602 PROJECTILE MPTS ASSY F/M830
0602 PROJ APDS-T-TP M737EI 105MM (TRAINING ONLY)
0602 PROJ ASSY F/105MM M774 APFSDS-T (DU)
0602 PROJ ASSY F/105MM 14735 APFSDS-T
0602 PROJ M833
0602 SHELL ILLUI4 M485 155MM
0602 MOTOR ROCKET BODY F/PROJ 8 INCH HE M650 RA
0611 COCO 0 F MOSSBERG NORTH HAVEN CT
0611 MORTAR, 4.2", W/E, M30
0611 CANNON, 4.2", M30
0652 COCO BERWICK FORGE & FAB BERWICK PA
0652 SHELL HE M106 8 IN
0654 COCO BETHLEHEM STEEL CO BETHLEHEM PA
0654 FORGING, TUBE, 105MM, M68
0654 TUBE, FORGING, ROTARY FORGED, 120MM1
0654 TUBE, FORGING, ROUGH FORGED, 120MM
0654 FORGING, TUBE, 155MM, MIA2
0654 FORGING, TUBE, 175MM, M113A1 (M107)
0654 FORGING, TUBE, 8", M201
0669 COCO F N MFG INC COLUMBIA SC
0669 RIFLE, 5.56MM, M16A2
0670 COCO AVCO CORP WILMINGTON MA
0670 FUZE M223
0670 FUZE PD M550
0721 COCO GREENE INTL WEST OCEANSIDE CA
0721 LINK METAL BELT M10 20MM
0721 LINK CTG MK 7 20MM
0721 LINK CTG M9 CAL. 50 MB
0721 LINK CTG M13 7.62MM M
0721 LINK METAL BELT M14A2 F/20MM
0721 LINK CTG M22 F/20MM
0721 LINK M27 F/CTG 5.56MM
0721 LINK METAL BELT M16A2 4041
0721 LINK CTG M15A2 CAL. 50 MB
0727 GOGO ROCK ISLAND ARSENAL ROCK ISLAND IL
0727 MACHINE GUN, CAL 50, FLEX M2 W/E SP BBL
0727 MACHINE GUN, CAL 50, M85
0727 GUN, AUTO, 25MM, W/BII, M242 (BUSHMASTER)
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 120MM, MIAl
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M37 (OH&RB)
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0727 HOWITZER, LT, TOWED, 105M, M102
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M2A5 (OH&RB)
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M2A5
0727 SLEEVE, TUBE SUPPORT
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M37
0727 HOWITZER, LT, TOWED, 105M, MI01AI
0727 HOWITZER, LT, TOWED, 105MM, M119AI
0727 EQUILIBRATOR
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M6A2 (OH&RB)
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M6A2
0727 CARRIAGE, HOWITZER, 155MM, M39
0727 HOWITZER, MED, TOWED, 155M, M198
0727 HOWITZER, MED, TOWED, 155MM, M198 (OH & RB)
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 8 IN., M174
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 8 IN., M174 (OH&RB)
0727 RECOIL, MECHANISM, M45 (OH&RB)
0727 LUG SUSPENSION MK 3 MOD 0
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 165MM, MI50
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 155MM, M178
0727 MOUNT, GUN, 155MM, M178 (OH&RB)
0728 GIGI FNC BSD MINNEAPOLIS, MN
0728 MK-41 MOD 0, 1 VERTICAL LAUNCH SYSTEM
0728 MK-13 MOD 4 GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCH SYSTEM
0728 MK-26 GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCH SYSTEM
0728 76MM MK75 GUN MOUNT
0728 5"/54 MK45 GUN MOUNT
0728 5"/54 MK6 AMMUNITION HOIST




0731 MISSILE: STANDARD 2
0731 MISSILE COMPONENTS
0731 NATO SEA SPARROW LAUNCHER
0731 SPARROW F14 ALUNCHER
0732 COCO FED CARTRIDGE CORP ANOKA MN
0732 CTG 5.56M BALL M193 lORD CLIP
0737 COCO AMRON CORP ANTIGO WI
0737 CASE CTG M103 20MM
0737 CASE CTG M21A1 20MM
0737 CASE CTG M195 40MM
0737 CASE CTG M118 40MM
0737 CASE CTG M169 40MM
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0738 GOCO EASTMAN KODAK CO ROCHESTER, NY
0738 MK-71 MOD 1-5 VARIABLE TIME FUZE (VT) 5"/38
0738 MK-404 INFRARED FUZE (IR) 3"/50, 76MM, 5"/54
0738 MK-417 INFRARED FUZE (IR) 76MM, 3"/50
0738 MK-418 PROXIMITY FUZE (POINT DET.) 5-/54
0743 COCO AMER INTL MFG CORP FT WORTH TX
0743 PROJ BODY MK 33-2
0743 PROJ BODY MK 56 F/5/38
0743 WARHEAD 5/38 MK 74
0743 PROJ BODY MK 61 F/5/54
0743 PROJ BODY MK 64 F/5/54
0743 PROJ BODY MK 51 F/5/38
0743 PROJ BODY MK 52 F/5/38
0743 PROJ BODY MK 48-1
0743 PROJ BODY MK 50 F/5/38
0743 SHELL HE M107 155MM
0748 COCO AMRON CORP WAUKESHA WI
0748 SHELL 20MM HEI M56A3/4/5
0748 SHELL HE DP M430 40MM
0748 SHELL HE DP M433 40MM
0748 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0748 BODY GRENADE HAND FRAG M67/M33.
0748 GRENADE MPTS F/M77 GRENADE (MLRS)
0748 CASE CTG MK 5 20MM ALL MODS
0759 COCO DAYRON (VALENTEC) ORLANDO FL
0759 FUZE M223 PROCURED LOADED
0759 FUZE PD M567
0759 FUZE PD M551 (T359E1)
0759 FUZE PD M550
0759 FUZE PD M549
0759 FUZE PD M758 PDSD F/CTG 25MM (BUSHMASTER)
0759 FUZE PD M935 & XM936 MPTS
0759 ESCAPEMENT ASSEMBLY F/M550 FUZE
0762 COCO GALION (VALENTEC) GALION OH
0762 FUZE PD M505A3
0762 CASE CTG M169 40MM
0763 COCO BULOVA SYSTEMS CORP VALLEY STREAM NY
0763 FUZE MT MK 339 MOD 1
0763 FUZE MTSQ M577
0763 FUZE PD M567
0763 FUZE PD M551 (T359E1)
0763 FUZE PD M550
0763 FUZE PD M549
0763 FUZE PD M758 PDSD F/CTG 25MM (BUSHMASTER)
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0763 FUZZ MTSQ M577AI/M582AI MPTS (PROCURED LOADED)
0763 FUZE PD M935 & XM936 MPTS
0763 ESCAPEMENT ASSEMBLY F/M550 FUZE
0764 GOCO STRATFORD ARMY ENG STRATFORD CT
0764 TURBINE ENGINES AIRCRAFT AND TANK
0766 COCO MEDICO INDUSTRIES WILKES BARRE PA
0766 SHELL HE F/M720 60MM
0766 SHELL HE M49A3 60MM
0766 SHELL HE M374A1 F/81MM MORTAR
0766 SHELL SMK M375A1 81MM
0766 PLUG SOLID NOSE FUZE MXU 735/B
0766 WARHEAD M151 2.75 IN
0768 COCO KISCO (VALENTEC) ST LOUIS MO
0768 CASE CTG 105MM M14B4 (M14 SERIES)
0768 CASE CTG BASE & SEAL (PN 12524833)
0768 CASE CTG M104 165MM
0768 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0768 GRENADE MPTS F/M77 GRENADE (MLRS)
0773 COCO EMCO INC GADSDEN AL
0773 SHELL HE DP M430 40MM
0773 BOOSTER M125A1
0773 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0773 FUZE M223 PROCURED LOADED
0773 GRENADE MPTS F/M77 GRENADE (MLRS)
0773 FUZE PD M52 BODY F/M525/M527
0773 FUZE PART S&A DEVICE F/FUZE M732
0780 COCO REXON TECHNOLOGY WAYNE NJ
0780 FUZE M223 PROCURED LOADED
0780 FUZE BODY M48A3 MPT F/M557 PD FUZE
0780 HEAD ASSY T336E7
0780 FUZE PD MK 29 MOD 5 NOSE NON-DELAY
0780 FUZE PD M739
0780 FUZE PD M567
0780 FUZE PD M551 (T359EI)
0780 FUZE PD M550
0780 FUZZ PD M549
0780 FUZZ PD M758 PDSD F/CTG 25MM (BUSHMASTER)
0780 S&A MODULE F/155MM M825 SMK
0780 FUZE PD M935 & XM936 MPTS
0780 ESCAPEMENT ASSEMBLY F/M550 FUZE
0783 COCO RAYTHEON-NIRP 469 BRISTOL TN
0783 FUZE SHORT INTRUSION PROX M732
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0801 COCO OLIN CORP MARION IL
0801 CTG 30MM TP M788
0801 CTG 20MM HEI M56A3 W/M22 LINK
0801 CTG 20MM TP M55A2 BULK
0801 CTG 25MM API PGU-20 W/O LINK (NAVY)
0801 CTG 20MM AP HEI PGU-28/B
0801 CTG 20M MPT-SD XM940
0801 CTG 20MM APDS MK149 (CIWS) PHALANX
0805 COCO AMERICAN BRASS DIV BUFFALO NY
0805 CUP CTG CASE 5.56MM
0805 CUP CTG CASE 7.62MM
0810 COCO EVEREADY BATTERY CO BENNINGTON VT
0810 ENERGIZER RESERVE MK 38
0810 POWER SUPPLY PS-115
0810 ENERGIZER RESERVE MK 40
0810 ENERGIZER RESERVE MK 43 MOD 0
0815 COCO BELL HELICOPTER FT WORTH TX
0815 HELICOPTERS UH-lB/D/H, OH-58C, AH-IS
0817 COCO MARQUARDT CORP VAN NUYS CA
0817 DISPENSER MK 7 MOD 3
0817 BOMBLET MKI18 SERIES F/DISP MK7 MODS 3/6
0818 COCO TEXAS INSTRUMENTS ATTLEBORO MA
0818 CUP BULLET JACKET TRACER GMCS 5.56MM
0818 CUP BULLET JACKET GMCS BALL 7.62MM
0818 CUP BULLET JACKET GMCS CAL. 50
0827 GOCO HERCULES MCGREGOR, TX
0827 MK-25 JATO
0827 HARM ASSEMBLY
0827 SPARROW ROCKET MOTOR CASE
0827 SIDEWINDER ROCKET MOTORS
0827 PHOENIX ROCKET MOTORS
0827 HARM ROCKET MOTORS
0843 COCO KDI PREC PRODS INC CINCINNATI OH
0843 DETONATOR FLASH WOX 80A
0843 DETONATOR MK 156 MOD 0
0843 S&A DEVICE M118
0843 FUZE ROCKET M427
0843 FUZE ROCKET M423
0843 DETONATOR WOX-87A
0843 DETONATOR MK 29 MOD 2
0843 FUZE MT/PD MK 403-0.
0843 FUZE MT MK 342 MOD 1
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0843 FUZE MT/PD MK 393 MOD 0
0843 FUZE AUXILIARY DETONATING MK 54 MOD 2
0843 FUZE SHORT INTRUSION PROX M732
0843 FUZE PART S&A DEVICE F/FUZE M732
0843 FUZE BD M534AI
0846 COCO COLT INDUSTRIES INC HARTFORD CT
0846 BARREL REPLACEMT & FR SIGHT ASSY (MI6AI)
0846 BARREL (M1911AI CAL 45 PISTOL)
0846 PISTOL, CAL 45, AUTO, M19llAl
0846 BOLT ASSEMBLY
0846 SUB-MACHINE GUN, FIRING PORT, 5.56MM, M231
0846 RIFLE, 5.56MM, M16A2
0846 RECEIVER, UPPER
0846 BARREL & FR SIGHT ASSEMBLY
0846 LAUNCHER, GRENADE, 40MM, M203
0846 BARREL ASSEMBLY
0853 COCO GENERAL ELECTRIC CO BURLINGTON VT
0853 GUNAUTO, 20MM, M197 (GATLING GUN)
0853 CANNON, 20MM, M168
0853 GUN, AIR DEF, TOW, 20MM, M167A1
0853 TURRET, UNIVERSAL, M97E1
0853 GUN, AIR DEF ART, SP, 20MM, M163A1
0855 COCO SINGER/LIBRASCOPE CORP GLENDALE, CA
0855 MK113 MOD9 FCS
0855 ME117 FCS
0855 MK113 MOD 10 FCS
0855 MK113 MOD 6-8 FCS
0855 MK116 MODS 1-4 FCS
0855 MK117 ATTACK CONTROL CONSOLE
0857 COCO HARLEY-DAVIDSON YORK PA
0857 BOMB BODY 500 LB MK 82
0866 COCO HECKETHORN MFG DYERSBURG TN
0866 SHELL HE DP M433 40MM
0866 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
0866 GRENADE MPTS F/M77 GRENADE (MLRS)
1000 GOCO HAWTHORNE AAP-D&Z HAWTHORNE NV
1000 BOMB GP MK 83 MOD 4 INERT W/CABLE ASSY & LUGS
1000 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-55/B FAE
1000 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-55A/B FUEL AIR EXP
1000 BOMB GP 500 LB MK 82 MODS LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1000 BOMB GP 500 LB GP MK 82 MOD 1 LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1000 BOMB GP ME 82-1 EMPTY W/O HARNESS W/LUGS (AF)
1000 BOOSTER FZU-2/B DWG 63C56569
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1000 DISPENSER & BOMB CBU-72/B
1000 BOMB GP 2000 LB MK 84 MOD 4 TRITONAL FILLED
1000 BOMB INERT MK84 TP AND NTP (NAVY)
1000 BOMB GE 2000 LB MK 84-6 H-6 FILLED W/HARNESS
1000 BOMB BDU-45/B INERT 500LB PRAC W/SPOTTING CHG
1000 BOMB GP 2000 LB MK 84 EMPTY W/O HARNESS (AF)
1000 BOMB GP EMPTY MK84 MOD4 (AIR FORCE)
1000 BOMB BDU-50/B INERT 500 LB PRACTICE
1000 WARHEAD 5 IN RKT HE MK 63 MOD 1
1000 CHARGE DEMO BLOCK 4-LB MK36 MOD-1
1001 GOGO MCALESTER AAP-GOGO MCALESTER OK
1001 BOMB GP 500 LB BLU-11/B PBX FILL (MK82)
1001 CTG 20ME-T
1001 CTG 20MM AP-T M95 BULK PACK
1001 CTG 20MM TP MK-105 MOD 0
1001 CTG 20MM LKD 4 TP M204 1 APT M95 W/M10 LK
1001 CTG 20MM TP M55 MLB HK 7 MOD 0
1001 CTG 20MM ELEC HEI MK 106 MOD 2 SC MK 5
1001 CTG 20MM ELEC APT MK 108 MOD 1 SC MK 5
1001 CTG 20MM ELEC API MK 107 MOD 1 SC MK 5
1001 CTG 20MM TP TEST CTG MK 109
1001 CTG 20M0 ELEC API MK 107 MOD 1 SC MK 5
1001 CTG 20M0 ELEC HEI MK 106 MOD 2 SC MK 5
1001 CTG 20M01 EEI M56A3 ELEC W/M14 LINK
1001 CTG 2010 LKD 4 EEI M210 I APT M95 W/M10 LK
1001 CTG 2010 HEI M56A3 W/M22 LINK
1001 CTG 2010 HEI M56A3 W/FUZE M505A3 LINKLESS
1001 CTG 20101 HEIR M242A1 W/FZ PD M505A3
1001 CTG 4010 HEIT-SD MK 11/MK 2 W/F MK 27
1001 PROJ 16/50 CAL AP
1001 PROJ 5/38 CAL HK 51 W/F VT-NSD
1001 CHARGE PROP 5/38 CAL FULL W/CASE MK 10/MK 11
1001 CTG 165MM EP M123A1 W/F M62A2
1001 PROJ 16/50 CAL HC MK13 BDF MK21
1001 PROJ 5/38 HE-CVT
1001 CHARGE PROP 5/54 CAL MK 67 MOD 3 W/CASE FULL
1001 PROJ 5/54 HE-MT/PD MKl15
1001 CHARGE PROP 5/54 CAL REDUCED MK68-2 W/STEEL CS
1001 PROJ 5/54 CAL HE-CVT MK127-0 W/F M732 PROX
1001 CHARGE PROP 155MM M119A2
1001 PROJ 5/38 CAL HE-PD W/MK 52 BODY & MK 29 FZ
1001 PROJ 16/50 CAL HIGH CAPACITY
1001 CHARGE PROP 5/38 CAL REDUCED W/CASE MK 10
1001 PROJ 16/50 BL&P MK141-0
1001 PROJ 5/38 CALVT NF MK 51 MOD 0
1001 PROJ 16/50 HE-CVT MK143-1
1001 PROJ 5/54 VT-NF MK100-1
1001 BOMB GP 500 LB MK 82 MOD 2 LOW DRAG H-6 LOADED
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1001 BOMB GP 500 LB MK 82 MODS LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1001 BOMB GP 500 LB GP MK 82 MOD 1 LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1001 BOMB GP 1000 LB MK 83 (NTP) LOW DRAG H-6 LOADED
1001 BOMB GP 2000 LB MK 84 MOD 4 TRITONAL FILLED
1001 BOMB BDU-45/B INERT 500LB PRAC W/SPOTTING CHG
1001 BOMB GP 500 LB MK82-4 H-6 FILLED W/HARNESS/LUGS
1001 BOMB GP 2000 LB MK 84 EMPTY W/O HARNESS (AF)
1001 BOMB GP EMPTY MK84 MOD4 (AIR FORCE)
1001 BOMB BDU-50/B INERT 500 LB PRACTICE
1001 BOMB GP 1000 LB BLU-110/B PBX FILL (MK83)
1001 MOTOR RKT ZUNI MK71/MODS 5 IN W/PROP GRAIN MK88
1001 MOTOR RKT SIN MK 22 MOD 4
1001 COMPOSITION A-5
1002 GOGO CRANE ARMY AMMO ACT CRANE IN
1002 PRIMERS DETONATORS RELAYS ALL TYPES (NAVY)
1002 CTG 3/50 BL&P MK177 NFL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 CAL MK 33 ALL MODS W/F VT MK 72
1002 CTG 3/50 AP FL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 HC FL SF
1002 CTG 3/50 AA FL SF
1002 CTG 3/50 HE-VT NFL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 HE-IR MK 175 NFL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 HC FL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 VT-RF NON-FRAG MK31 W/F MK72-17
1002 CTG 3/50 VT FL SF
1002 CTG 3/50 HE VT NSD NFL RF
1002 CTG 3/50 CAL AP FL SF
1002 CTG 3/50 BL&P FL SF MK 185-0
1002 CTG 3/50 ILLUM FL-RF
1002 CTG 76M HE-IR MK 199-1
1002 CTG 76MM HE-PD MK200-1 W/F MK407-1
1002 CTG 76101 BL&P MK201-1
1002 CTG 7610 HE-VT MK 208-0
1002 CTG 3/50 ILLUM FL SF MK 25
1002 CTG 76104 VT NF
1002 PROJ LOAD MK 12 F/3/50
1002 PROP CHARGE ASSY F/16/50 CAL GUN AMMO (FULL)
1002 PROP CHARGE ASSY F/16/50 CAL GUN AMMO FLASHLESS
1002 PROP CHARGE ASSY F/16/50 CAL GUN AMMO, REDUCED
1002 PROJ 5/38 BL&P MK110-3
1002 PROJ 5/38 MT/PD TP SMK PUFF MK138-0
1002 PROJ 5/38 HE-IR MK119-0
1002 PROJ 5/38 CAL HE-CVT RAP
1002 PROJ 5/54 CAL BL&P MK 92 MOD 1
1002 PROJ 5/54 WP SMK MK89-0
1002 CTG 165MM HEP M123A1 W/F M62A2
1002 PROJ 5/38 WP
1002 PROJ 5/54 HE-IR MK107
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PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
1002 PROJ 5/38 HE MT/PD MK99-4
1002 PROJ 5/38 ILLUM MK87-3 W/FZ MK403
1002 PROJ 5/54 HE-MT/PD MK115
1002 PROJ 5/54 HE-VT (PROX) MK116
1002 BEAKER EXP LOADED PBXN-106
1002 PROJ 5/54 HE-MT/PD HI-FRAG MK82
1002 PROJ 5/54 CAL HE-CVT MK127-0 W/F M732 PROX
1002 PROJ 5/54 CAL TP PUFF W/MT FUZE MK342
1002 PROJ 5/54 CAL MK97 PUFF-PD W/FCLMK2
1002 PROJ 5/54 ILLUM MK91-0
1002 PROJ 5/38 CAL AAC
1002 PROJ 5/54 HC HE-PD MK108
1002 CHG PROP F/16/50 FULL CHG/45
1002 BOMB GP 500 LB GP MK 82 MOD 1 LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1002 BOMB GP 500 LB MK 82 MODS LOW DRAG TRITONAL
1002 BOMB GP 2000 LB MK 84 MOD 4 TRITONAL FILLED
1002 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-MK 20 TP W/DISP MK 7
1002 BOMB GP 500 LB MK82-4 H-6 FILLED W/HARNESS/LUGS
1002 BOMB PRACTICE ROCKEYE II MK20 MOD 8
1002 WARHEAD 5 IN RKT SMK WP MK 34 MOD 1 (ZUNI)
1002 IGNITER MK 282 F/5 IN RKT MTR MK 71
1002 MARKER STD LOCATION A/C GROUND-MARINE LUU-10/B
1002 SIGNAL ILLUM MK2 MOD 1 GREEN STAR
1002 SIGNAL ILLUM MARINE RED COMET MK 1 MOD 0
1002 SIGNAL ILLUM MARINE GREEN COMET MK 1 MOD 0
1002 SIGNAL ILLUM MARINE YELLOW COMET
1002 FLARE AIRCRAFT DECOY MK 50
1002 SIGNAL SMK & ILLUM MARINE MK 99 MOD 3 YELLOW
1002 MARKER LOCATION MARINE MK25 MOD 3
1002 CTG PHOTOFLASH M123A1
1002 SIGNAL SMK & ILLUM MK 66 RED
1002 SIGNAL SMOKE AND ILLUMINATION MK 124 MOD 0
1002 MARKER LOCATION MARINE YELLOW MK58
1002 SIGNAL SMK & ILLUM MK 117 GREEN PARA
1002 SIGNAL SMK & ILLUM ME 118 YELLOW PARA
1002 CHARGE ASSY DEMO MK 133 MOD 2
1002 DETONATOR MK 43 MOD 1
1002 DETONATOR MK 18 MOD 0
1002 DETONATOR MK 56 MOD 0
1002 DETONATOR ME 59 MOD 0
1002 DETONATOR DWG AF 755107
1002 DETONATOR MK 95 MOD 0
1002 DETONATOR MK 37 MOD 0
1002 CTG IMPULSE CAL .50 ELEC INIT
1002 PRIMER PERC MK 134 MOD 0
1002 PRIMER PERC MK 101 MOD 3
1002 DISPENSER & BOMB ACFT CBU-MK 20NTP W/DISP MK7
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PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
1005 COCO INTERCONTINENTAL GARLAND TX
1005 BOMB BODY 1000 LB MK 83
1005 BOMB BODY 500 LB MK 82
1005 BOMB BODY MK 84 EMPTY
1009 COCO ACTION MFG CO PLT 1 PHILADELPHIA PA
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE, M134A1
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE, M21A1
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE, M146
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE, M145
1009 LINKAGE ASSEMBLY (FOR M145 MNT TELESCOPE)
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE & QUADRANT, M172
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE & QUADRANT, M171
1009 SIGHT UNIT, W/COVER M64
1009 MOUNT, TELESCOPE, M64A1 SIGHT
1009 TELESCOPE, ELBOW, M64A1 SIGHT
1009 QUADRANT, FIRE CONTROL, M15
1013 GOCO MISSISSIPPI AAP-M&C PICAYUNE MS
1013 PROJ 155104 HE DP (ICM) M483A1
1013 PROJ 15510 HE DP (ICM) M483A1
1013 SHELL HE M483 155MM
1013 SHELL HE M483 155MM
1013 CHARGE EXPULSION F/155MM M483AI
1013 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
1013 GRENADE MPTS F/M42 & M46 GRENADES
1013 LEAD CUP ASSY DWG 9215330
1014 COCO T N NUC SP(AEROJET) JONESBORO TN
1014 CTG 25MM API PGU-20 W/O LINK (NAVY)
1014 SHOT API 30101 (GAU-8)
1015 COCO AEROJET ORD&MFG CO DOWNEY CA
1015 CTG 2511 APDS-T M791 W/M28 LINK
1015 CTG 25101 TP-T M793 W/M28 LINK
1015 CTG 25101 HEI-T M792 W/F M758 PDSD W/M28 LINK
1015 CTG 30M 5-API PGU-14A/B 1-HEI PGU-13A/B GAU-8
1015 CTG 25MM DUMMY PGU-24/U
1015 CTG 25MM TP PGU-23/U W/O TR
1015 CTG 25MM HEI PGU-22 W/O LINK (NAVY)
1015 CTG 25MM HEI PGU-25
1015 CTG 25MM HEIT NK210 MOD 2
1015 CTG 25101 TPDS-T M910
1016 COCO AEROJET ORD&MFG CO CHINO CA
1016 CTG 30101 TP PGU-15/B (GAU-8)
1016 CTG 30MM HEI (GAU-8) PGU-13/B
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PEP# TYPE CONTRACTOR/FACILITY NAME LOCATION
1017 COCO US NAVY RESERVE PLT ROCHESTER NY
1017 FUZE MULTI-OPTION M734
1018 COCO ACCUDYNE CORP JANESVILLE WI
1018 FUZE MULTI-OPTION M734
1018 FUZE SHORT INTRUSION PROX M732
1018 POWER SUPPLY PS-115
1018 FUZE PART S&A DEVICE F/FUZE M732





2003 COCO KAMAN BLOOMFIELD, CT
2003 NAVY HELICOPTER COMPONENTS FOR SH2
2003 AHI BLADES
2003 F14 SURFACES (SKIN)
2003 A6E DOORS AND FAIRINGS
2003 EA6B DOORS AND FAIRINGS
2003 C5B FLAPS AND SPOILDRS AND TRUST REVERSAL
2004 GOCO TELEDYNE TOLEDO, OH




hPPZNDZX B: NUMBER OF PLANT ZQUIPIUgT PACGS
FISCAL
YEAR ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE
1978 197 12 4
1979 158 12 4
1980 151 12 4
1981 147 12 3
1982 148 13 3
1983 149 13 2
1984 149 13 0
1985 143 13 0
1986 128 13 0
1987 120 13 0
1988 112 10 0
1989 99 10 0
1990 94 10 0
1991 92 8 0
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APPENDIX C: CONDITION CODE DEFINITIONS
Federal Property Management Regulation
41CFR, 101-43.4801
CONDITION CODES AND EXPANDED DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of indicating condition of the property,
the following codes should be used. Use a combination of





A. Serviceable - Issuable without qualification/new,
used, repaired, or reconditioned material which is
serviceable and issuable to all customers without
limitations or restrictions. Includes material with
more that 6 months shelf-life remaining.
B. Serviceable - Issuable with qualification/new, used,
repaired, or reconditioned material which is
serviceable and issuable for its intended purpose but
which is restricted from issue to specific units,
activities, or geographical areas by reason of its
limited usefulness or short service-life expectancy.
Includes material with 3 through 6 months shelf-life
remaining.
C. Serviceable - Priority issue less than 3 month shelf-
life/items which are serviceable and issuable to
selected customers, but must be issued before
condition A and B material to avoid loss as a usable
asset. Includes material with less than 3 months
shelf-life remaining.
D. Serviceable - Test/modification/serviceable material
requires test, alternation, modification, conversion
or disassembly (This does not include items which must
be inspected or tested immediately prior to issue).
E. Unserviceable - Minor repairs/material which involves
only limited expenses or effort to restore to
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serviceable condition and which is accomplished in the
storage activity where the stock is located.
F. Unserviceable - Repairable/economically reparable
material which requires repair, overhaul, or
reconditioning (includes reparable items which are
radioactively contaminated).
G. Unserviceable - Incomplete/material requiring
additional parts or components to complete the end
item prior to issue.
H. Unserviceable - Condemned/material which has been
determined to be unserviceable and does not meet
repair criteria.
S. Unserviceable - Scrap/material that has no value





1. Unused - good/unused property that is usable without
repairs and identical or interchangeable with new
items from normal supply sources.
2. Unused - Fair/unused property that is usable without
repairs but is deteriorated or damaged to the extent
that utility is somewhat impaired.
3. Unused - Poor/unused property that is usable without
repairs but is considerably deteriorated or damaged.
Enough utility remains to classify the property better
than salvage.
4. Used - Good/used property that is usable without
repairs and most of its useful life remains.
5. Used - Fair/used property that is usable without
repairs, but is somewhat worn or deteriorated and may
soon require repairs.
6. Used - Poor/used property that may be used without
repairs, but is considerably worn or deteriorated to
the degree that remaining utility is limited or major
repairs will soon be required.
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7. Repairs required/under 16% of acquisition cost.
Required repairs are minor and should not exceed 15%
of original acquisition cost.
8. Repairs required/16-40% of acquisition cost. Required
repairs are considerable and are from 16% to 40% of
original acquisition cost.
9. Repairs required/41-65% of acquisition cost. Required
repairs are major because the property is badly
damage, worn, or deteriorated, and are estimated to
range from 41% to 65% of original acquisition cost.
X. Salvage/property has some value in excess of its basic
material content, but repair or rehabilitation to use
for the originally intended purpose is clearly
impractical. Repair for any use would exceed 65% of
the original acquisition cost.
S. Scrap/material that has no value except for its basic
material content.
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A2PPENDIX D: LCMI-GRXDLZY L&TNES
KEY
Amron: Aaron Corp., Antigo, WI
Avco: Avco Corp., Wilmington, MA
Covert: Covert MFG Co., Galion, OH
F N MFG: F N MFG Inc., Ind Park, Columbia, SCRiver:
Galion: Galion (Valentec), Galion, OH
Hamilton: Hamilton Technology, Lancaster, PA
Harley: Harley-Davidson, York, PA
Honey: Honeywell Inc. - TCAAP, New Britan, MN
KDI PPI: KDI Precious Productss Inc., Cincinnati, OH
Kisco: Kisco (Valentec), St. Louis, MO
Lake C: Lake City AAP-Olin, Independence, MO
Pohlman: Pohlman (Valentec), Maryland Heights, MO
Reader: Reader & Kline Co., Carmel, IN
Rexon: Rexon Technology, Wayne, NJ
River: Riverbank Army Ammunition Plant, Riverbank, CA
SACO: SACO Defense Inc., Saco, MA
X-FAC: X-FAC-Poloron, Bloomsburg, PA
SIX SPINDLE ACHE-GRIDLEY LATHES
ACTIVE
UNITED STATES AR~MY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
River 341607246 A5 8"1 chk 1952
Aaron 341610626 F8 0.563" 1941
Aaron 341610678 F8 0.563" 1942
Amron 341614069 F8 0.563" 1941
Aaron 341614082 F8 0.563" 1941
None 341614088 F8 0.563" 1941
None 341615413 A5 1.625" 1952
Aaron 341617105 F8 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618846 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618852 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618853 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618854 AS 0.563" 1942
Subtotal -12
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SIX SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
ACTIVE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
- --------- --------- ---------- ------------
Lake C 341618856 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618869 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618871 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618874 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618876 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619064 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619066 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619072 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619074 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619075 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619087 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341619090 AS 0.563"1 1942
Honey 341630228 A5 0.438" 1961
Kisco 341630806 A5 1.25" 1954
Kisco 341631029 A5 1.25" 1954
Kisco 341632493 AS 1.25" 1954
Kisco 341632831 A5 1.25" 1954
Galio 341632891 A4 1.0" 1951
Galio 341632892 A4 1.0" 1952
Amron 341634177 F8 2-3/8"chk 1967
River 341637291 A4 8" chk 1976
River 341637292 At 8" chk 1976
River 341637293 Ak 8" chk 1976
River 341637294 A4 8" chk 1976
River 341637547 A6 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637548 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637549 A4 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637560 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637561 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637757 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637758 A4 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637759 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637760 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341637761 A5 2-3/8"chk 1977
River 341638314 A4 2-3/8"chk 1978
River 341638317 A4 2-3/8"chk 1978
River 341638315 A4 2-3/8"chk 1978
River 341638320 A4 2-3/8"chk 1978
River 341639476 Al 2-3/8"chk 1986
Subtotal - 39
Grand Total - 51
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SIX SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
INACTIVE
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERINT ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
River 341600940 A5 8"chk 1952
Kisco 341602457 A5 1.625" 1952
Lake C 341602477 A5 0.563" 1951
Rexon 341602485 A4 1.25" 1951
Dayron 341602557 A6 2.00" 1951
Pohlman 341602569 A5 1.25" 1951
Dayron 341602599 A6 2.00" 1951
Dayron 341602601 A6 2.00" 1951
Saco 341602608 A4 1.25" 1951
Pohlman 341602615 A4 1.25" 1951
Pohlman 341602633 A5 1.25" 1951
Galion 341602636 A5 1.00" 1952
Pohlman 341602639 A6 1.25" 1951
Pohlman 341602640 A5 1.25" 1951
Pohlman 341602641 A5 1.25" 1951
Kisco 341604138 F9 1.625" 1952
Rexon 341606530 F7 2.625" 1951
X-FAC-T 341606531 A4 2.625" 1944
Lake C 341607801 A4 0.563" 1952
Lake C 341610272 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610273 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610274 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610275 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610276 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610277 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610279 A5 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610280 AS 1.00" 1952
Lake C 341610281 A5 1.00" 1952
Amron 341610494 F8 0.563" 1942
Pohlman 341610495 AS 0.563" 1942
Pohlman 341610496 A5 0.563" 1942
Pohlman 341610499 AS 0.563" 1943
Pohlman 341610500 AS 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341610507 A4 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341610605 AS 0.563" 1942
Amron 341610616 A4 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610620 78 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610621 78 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610630 A4 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610633 A4 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610634 A4 0.563" 1941
Amron 341610636 A4 0.563" 1941
Subtotal - 42
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SIX SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
INACTIVE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
Amron 341610641 F8 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610648 A5 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610651 A5 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610652 A5 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610653 AS 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610654 A5 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341610655 A5 0.563" 1941
KDI PPI 341611285 A6 1.25" 1944
Kisco 341611300 A5 5.25"chk 1952
Kisco 341611302 F9 5.25"chk 1951
Lake C 341611597 A4 0.563" 1941
Pohlman 341612197 A4 1.25" 1952
Amron 341612735 F8 0.563" 1941
Honey 341612771 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341613819 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341613822 A6 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341613826 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341613829 A6 0.563" 1942
Amron 341614080 F8 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341614687 A5 0.563" 1943
Lake C 341614690 A5 0.563" 1943
Lake C 341618857 A4 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618873 A4 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618903 F9 0.563" 1943
Lake C 341618913 A5 0.563" 1943
Lake C 341618914 A6 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341618917 A6 0.563" 1943
Lake C 341619089 A5 0.563" 1942
Honey 341619378 A5 0.563" 1953
Kisco 341620634 A5 1.625" 1954
Amron 341620953 A4 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341621721 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341622566 A5 1.25" 1954
Lake C 341622719 A5 0.563" 1941
Lake C 341622720 A5 0.563" 1942
Lake C 341622722 A5 0.563" 1942
River 341623000 A5 8"chk 1954
River 341623002 A5 8"chk 1954
River 341623003 A5 8"chk 1954
River 341623007 A5 8"chk 1954
River 341623009 A5 8"chk 1954
X-FAC 341623211 A4 8"chk 1945
Subtotal - 42
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SIX SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
INACTIVE CONTINUED
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
X-FAC 341626810 A5 8"chk 1952
Honey 341630017 A5 0.438" 1961
Honey 341630018 A5 0.438" 1961
Honey 341630019 A5 0.438" 1961
Honey 341630227 A5 0.438" 1961
Pohlman 341630796 A5 1.25" 1951
Pohlman 341630802 A5 1.25" 1954
River 341632450 A5 8"chk 1951
Pohlman 341632491 AS 1.25" 1951
Honey 341632657 A6 2.625" 1942
Avco 341632671 A5 1.25" 1952
Avco 341632672 A5 1.25" 1952
Galion 341632883 A4 1.0" 1954
Galion 341632887 A4 1.0' 1954
River 341633181 A5 8"chk 1952
Rexon 341633405 A4 1.25" 1966
Pohlman 341633407 A6 1.25" 1966
Pohlman 341633408 A6 1.25" 1966
Lake C 341633453 AS 0.438 1966
Action 341634004 A4 0.563" 1952
F N MFG 341634579 A5 1.0" 1953
F N MFG 341634613 A4 1.25" 1951
F N MFG 341634616 A5 0.563" 1952
Rexon 341635277 A4 1.25" 1950
Lake C 341635522 A4 0.563" 1952
Avco 341636661 A5 1.25" 1952
Avco 341636662 A5 1.25" 1952
Harley-D 341637983 A6 10"chk 1953
Honey 341638817 A4 5.25" 1981
Honey 341638818 A4 5.25" 1981
Subtotal = 30
Grand Total - 114
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EIGHT SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
INACTIVE
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
----- ------------------------------------------
Kisco 341600948 A5 6"chk 1945
Kisco 341610380 F8 8"chk 1950
Kisco 341615158 A4 6"chk 1952
Kisco 341615158 F7 6"chk 1952
Kisco 341617559 A5 6"chk 1953
Honey 341617554 AS 6"chk 1953
Reader 341617611 F9 8"chk 1953
Saco 341620657 A5 1.625" 1954
F N Mfg 341627077 A5 1.625" 1952
Honey 341629905 A5 6"chk 1951
Honey 341629915 A5 6"chk 1951
Honey 341629918 A5 6"chk 1951
F N MFG 341630295 A5 1.25" 1962
River 341630305 A5 8"chk 1950
Kisco 341630544 A5 8"chk 1954
Honey 341630774 A5 6"chk 1953
Honey 341630775 A5 6"chk 1951
Honey 341631978 A5 6"chk 1963
Honey 341631979 A5 6"chk 1963
Honey 341631980 A4 6"chk 1963
River 341632207 A5 8"chk 1954
Honey 341633208 A6 6"chk 1953
Honey 341633209 A6 6"chk 1953
Kisco 341633849 A5 6"chk 1953
Covert 341634564 A6 6"chk 1957
River 341636883 A5 8"chk 1973
River 341636894 A5 8"chk 1973
River 341636897 A5 8"chk 1973
River 341636898 A5 8"chk 1973
Amron 341638190 F8 1.625" 1978
Hamilton 341638900 A5 2.625" 1980
Hamilton 341638901 A5 2.625" 1980
Hamilton 341638902 A5 1.25" 1980
Hamilton 341638903 A5 1.25" 1980
Total - 34
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EIGHT SPINDLE ACME-GRIDLEY LATHES
ACTIVE
UNITED STATES ARMY INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
Serial Condition Bar/Chuck Year
Location Number Code Diameter Manufactered
F N MFG 341630296 A5 1.25" 1962
River 341637183 A5 8"chk 1975
River 341637253 A5 8"chk 1975
River 341637260 A5 8"chk 1975
River 341637261 A5 8"chk 1975
River 341637262 A5 8"chk 1975
River 341637307 A5 8"chk 1976
River 341637308 A5 8"chk 1976
River 341637309 A5 8"ck 1976
Total - 9
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APPNDIX Z: 81 MORTAR CASING
81 mm MORTAR CASING MACHINING OPERATION
PERFORMED BY AN~ ACNE~-GRIDLEY 8 SPINDLE, 8- CHUCKING LATHE
RIVERBANK ARMY AMMUNIT ION PLANT, RIVERBANK, CALIFORNIA







APNlDIX T: VISUAL ClUCM-OFF SMMlT
VISUAL CHECK-OFF SHEET FOR
INDUSTRIAL PLANT EQUIPMENT CONDITION ASSESSMENTS
USED BY: INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING ACTIVITY
ITV1 2 I-- -- -- -- - I- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
10 0C!4l103A7 PEP 0727 ;ICNU. 1O1'.IU 381 r APPEARANCE
- __I t .- -~ -PEC 3&1111l32l70?6 CATfCIjRY IPE I- F -- ~~I ---------- I- --
LCCATICN IS RCCK ISLAkD ARSENAL [ch~~'E~R TI L1.
PIN No. 99909? 5TATUS _cLOE7 if! -- Pc -------- :---
MFC Ar*CA INTL CCFP. YEAR PFG 4.! 1 A:._ CkACKE'4 -JtVEt
N13MMCLAUPEI
MIE ICHT Z! VI!CH- iltcu ir tfl VTF------;--------- T
HGOEU-NG.A --- I A ORI, ,Pu 5* TAKs
-MQDC-L-+.e.~~ 5CF PIP-Ik4fi MUSE-P FLTE45 I
SERIAL NO. 8734.I5 I I-
TAG NO. PIA 20291 I 6. HVORAULIC, ~ i7 Ii - _
-c*Ce ~ e -- ii e Pt-tts-kT, A~tr Mvd CYIDR,* m N .
TYPE ASSES SPENT--V I SAL ___.,. ALYTZCAL..... 9. 0 IALS'I
Q NG1TM4-C-16-A GARIf'T STR EI !----S--I -B. SPIN LEd, BEARINGS, Et!-
ES ~C rT-------- C. SHAFTS, BEAPINGS, tR -
ETPARTS CEST -------- --------- I FPPD GIF------------I +I A. WAYS, GIGS , klFERS, I I I
I b. WORK dEARAC SLRFACcS I I IEST 70TAL CCST - -- -I- ---
C LSA LEVERic DO,~ IE-5
PC (PPM)* ----- PCs TEST CATE:I FOM ADLLV(E I-
_pc 127 -W!;Fn ___ II--
F : MPPINAuTRIN CCPP ~M -SI I ~
DATE: r A.
---------------------------------------------------
LEGEND: Z - EXCELLENT, G - GOOD, F - FAIR, P - POOR
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